AJANTA'S SERIES ON AESTHETICS 2



ABHINAVAGUPTA ON INDIAN AESTHETICS

Y.S. WALIMBE

INTRODUCTION By:
T.G.MAINKAR

Abhinavagupta on Indian Aesthetics


AJANTA'S SERIES ON AESTHETICS 2

ABHINAVAGUPTA ON INDIAN AESTHETICS

Y.S. WALIMBE

Introduction by
T.C. MAINKAR

1980



1st Published 1980

By S. Balwant
For AJANTA PUBLICATIONS (India)
1, U.B., Jawahar Nagar,
Bungalow Road, Delhi-110007.

Price Rs. 35 $ 6

Distributors :
AJANTA BOOKS INTERNATIONAL
1 U.B., Jawahar Nagar,
Bungalow Road, DELHI-110007.

Printed by :
Avtar Printers,
Nirankari Colony, Delhi-110009.

INTRODUCTION

I have indeed very great pleasure in writing this introduction for this interesting book on Abhinavagupta by my friend, Dr. Y.S. Walimbe. Dr. Walimbe has been my colleague in the University of Bombay and has been teaching Alaṁkāraśāstra to the Post-Graduate students for quite a number of years. Besides, his own research work has been on the Rasagaṅgādhara of Shrī Jagannātha Paṇḍita. I am mentioning these facts only to show how very well qualified Dr. Walimbe is to undertake the task he has chosen here.

The aim here is to present to an inquisitive reader the views of the great Abhinavagupta on the celebrated Rasasūtra of Bharata. Recently interest has been aroused in Sanskrit Aesthetics and particularly in Abhinavagupta and his predecessors, whom he is seen criticising and on whom he has undoubtedly improved. Gnoli, Masson, Patwardhan, Pandey—all these scholars have elucidated Abhinavagupta no doubt admirably and competently, and yet, one felt, looking to the writings of students on Aesthetics about Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta that it was indeed very necessary to present Abhinavagupta's presentation of his material in a 'plain unvarnished manner' so that those interested in knowing him might read his view rendered in a modern language but at the same time in a well-authoritative and documented manner. Dr. Walimbe has carried out the task in an admirable manner and the post-graduate University students and the general readers interested in Sanskrit Aesthetics are bound to feel greatly helped by him and therefore would feel very much grateful to him. Aesthetics at its higher reaches can hardly be disassociated from Philosophy, and it requires a thorough understanding of the Indian philosophical thought like the

Mīmāṁsā, the Sāṁkhya and the Śaiva-advaita to be able to follow the discussions of Bharata's erudite scholars. Understanding Abhinavagupta is a reward of painstaking sound scholarship. Dr. Walimbe's explanations are faithful and he has not tried to be 'learned' while commenting on or rendering the learned Abhinavagupta.

I am sure that scholars and general readers will welcome the book and will be further expecting from Dr. Walimbe his similar presentation of the thought of Jagannātha Paṇḍita, for, like Abhinavagupta, Jagannātha is also a challenge for one's powers of understanding and scholarship. The students of Alaṅkārasāstra and of Bharata will be indebted for this small but immensely helpful tract.

Aradhana
Poona-16

T.G. Mainkar

PREFACE

The object of this monograph is to present to the students of Indian Poetics and Aesthetics, in a nutshell, the aesthetic thought of Abhinavagupta, one of the greatest geniuses that India has produced. This has been done mainly on the basis of his masterly and authoritative commentary, the Abhinavabhāratī, on the Rasasūtra in Adhyāya IV of Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra. The validity of Abhinavagupta's observations is not confined to drama and poetry, but they are comprehensive enough to cover practically all Indian arts. The main argument is first presented in English, followed by the relevant Sanskrit text supplied in the brackets. It is hoped that this will render the discussion useful even to those readers who are not well-versed in Sanskrit, but who are interested in Indian Aesthetics. The Introduction by the author explores the possibility of a general aesthetic theory for Indian literature and the fine arts. The Appendix consists of parallel passages on the relevant topics from the Locana on the Dhvanyāloka.

The author is deeply indebted to all earlier writers on the subject. He would also like to acknowledge his special gratitude to Dr. T.G. Mainkar, former Head of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Bombay, for writing very kindly the introduction to the book.

—Y.S. Walimbe

CONTENTS

1

INTRODUCTION

AESTHETICS, or the theory of beauty in art and literature, has perhaps been one of the early pursuits of the human mind. As literature and the various arts flourish in a society, the attempt to understand the exact nature and causes of their appeal to the reader or the connoisseur also finds a place in the thinking mind. A thing of beauty is not only a joy for ever, but is also an invitation for ever to explore the reasons for that joy. Since poetry and drama are the earliest arts, it was only natural that the science of Aesthetics should be inspired by the thoughts about early poetry and drama. *Aristotle's Poetics, for example, is regarded not only as the first treatise setting forth his theory of poetry and drama*, but also about art in general (cf. *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* by S. H. Butcher, Dover, 1951). Since the aim of all arts was regarded to be the attempt to delight the human mind, the analysis of the joy resulting from poetry and drama was also supposed to be more or less similar to that resulting from the appreciation of other fine arts, based on a kind of unity of all the arts. This idea of the unity of all arts is no longer universally accepted, and some eminent art-critics and philosophers have openly challenged it (**cf.** *Problems of Art* by Susanne K. Langer, Routledge and K. Paul, London, **1957**, p. 14). But the fact remains that

speculations on the nature of poetry or literature and drama were the precursors or harbingers of aesthetic speculations in general.

At least in India, this was certainly the case. The earliest distinct speculations on the nature of art and its purpose are clearly set forth by Bharata in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* in connection with the art of drama. Since *vācika abhinaya* or verbal gesticulation formed a very essential part of the four-fold dramatic gesticulation, the dramatic theme or text (*nāṭyārtha* or *kāvyārtha*) became equally important in Bharata's eyes. He concerns himself mainly with the emotional value or import of the dramatic theme and its actual representation on the stage, so as to bring home this emotional aspect to the enlightened spectators in a very vivid and convincing manner. Bharata's account of *Rasa* in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, as explained in *Adhyāyas* (Chapters) VI and VII, is nothing but the analysis of the emotional experience through which the spectator goes, while watching a dramatic performance on the stage. Bharata expressly states that the *Nātyaveda* was promulgated by Lord Brahman himself as an object of diversion or recreation (*krīḍanīyaka*) at the behest of all gods (*Nāṭyaśāstra*, I, II), and the purpose of drama is to entertain the minds of the spectators and also to instruct them[1]. Drama comprehends in itself all branches of learning, all arts, all crafts, all skill, all aspects of human nature and worldly behaviour, represented through gesticulation.[2]

The nature of dramatic experience and the delight it gives to the cultivated spectator are the essence of Bharata's theory of *Rasa*. According to him, the spectator's experience is essentially a pleasurable emotional experience. The drama presents a story, and is mainly a story dealing with human emotions and sentiments. Bharata's definitions of *bhāvas*, *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc.[3], leave no doubt about this point. This story of human emotions is replenished with various kinds of gesticulation, and enriched with the means of

entertainment like vocal and instrumental music, dance, drapery, the theatrical settings, etc., and presented to the spectator as a feast to his eyes, ears and mind, a sacrifice charming even in the estimation of the gods themselves, as Kālidāsa puts it.[4] The total experience of delight that the spectatar undergoes—a kind of a unique, homogeneous experience, is *Rasa*.

This theory of *Rasa* expounded by Bharata assumed so much importance in later times that it came to be regarded as the only theory explaining dramatic experience, and later scholars like Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śrī Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, and Abhinavagupta (following his master Bhaṭṭa Tauta) expounded it in various ways. It is quite likely that there were many more explanations about it. Jagannātha mentions as many as eleven in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, but these four may be regarded as the most important ones. At least, these are the views that have come down to us, as recorded by Abhinavagupta in *Abhinavabhāratī*, his commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, and in his *Locana*, a commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana. There we come to understand that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa agreed to *Rasa* being a product of the stimulants (*vibhāvas*) which are reactions of the hero (*anubhāvas*) to them, and the ancillary feelings or moods (*vyabhicārins*) in the particular situation, when all of them combine with the *sthāyin* or the latent emotion of the hero or the principal character in the play (*anukārya*). According to him, the sthāyin belongs to this character, and hence *Rasa* also belongs mainly to him, and only indirectly to the actor who enlivens or portrays him on the stage. Thus, the character and the actor are the two points on a straight line. However, Lollaṭa did not account for the role of the spectator in the theatre, who experiences pleasure after witnessing the performance.

Śaṅkuka went a step further, and tried to account for the spectator's role in the process of *Rasa*. In his opinion, *Rasa*

results from the actor's skilful imitation of the character like Rāma, and the spectator's apprehension of the situation is *a unique kind of experience, quite different from any usual category of worldly knowledge*. The actor's imitation gives him delight, as he can infer the character's emotion on the strength of this imitation. This is no doubt an improvement over Lollaṭa's view, but still not very convincing, since the spectator's apprehension can hardly be described as being inferential in nature which is, as a matter of fact, an imaginative one.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka challenged the views of both Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka, and offered a new explanation of the process of *Rasa* or aesthetic delight. In his opinion, the process of *Rasa* takes three different stages to complete itself. The first stage is obviously that of *abhidhā* denotation, where the words of the dramatic text render their primary meaning. The second stage is that of *bhāvanā* or *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (generalization), i.e., idealization of the dramatic theme effected through four-fold gesticulation. Because of this phenomenon, the spectator's mind becomes free from all kinds of delusion or ignorance, and he attains the level of an ideal spectator (*sahṛdaya*). In the third stage known as *bhoga* or delectation, his mind is dominated only by *sattva* or purity, to the utter exclusion of *Rajas* and *tamas*, the tendencies of delusion and stupefaction in human nature; and then only he experiences the supreme joy of art, comparable only to the bliss emanating from the Supreme Brahman.

UNIVERSALITY OF EMOTION

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka had thus very nearly analysed the entire process of the realization of *Rasa*, and it was left to Abhinavagupta, as it were, only to fill up the gaps in the former's explanation, and point out the lacuna therein. Abhinavagupta rejects the idea of the three *guṇas* or qualities like *rajas*, forming an important link in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's

argument. He accepts Nāyaka's concept of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* or universalization, but asserts that this is already achieved by the process of *vyañjanā* or poetic suggestion, and hence, it is redundant to admit a new process like *bhāvanā*. Further, even the idea of *bhoga* is nothing else, but that of *carvaṇā*, relish only, which itself culminates in the ecstatic joy of the spectator. According to Abhinavagupta, the entire process of Rasa-realization can be summed up in this manner : when an ideal spectator (*sahṛdaya*), gifted with emotional maturity and aesthetic sensitivity, witnesses a good play on the stage, enriched by fine acting, music, dance, theatrical decorations, costumes, etc., he grasps the theme of the play not in a particular, but in a general context. The dramatic theme becomes free from such limitations as are imposed thereon by the stints and beyonds of time and place, and the spectator also gets rid of the restrictions, foisted upon him by his individual surroundings and their effects. He relishes the play from a detached angle, and with the necessary aesthetic or psychic distance (*tāṭasthya*). It is only then that the real meaning or beauty of the dramatic theme dawns upon him, and he becomes the recipient of the highest aesthetic bliss. Since the latent emotions (*sthāyins*) of all human beings are more or less similar in nature, inherited from previous existences, the response of all spectators to a play is also practically uniform, representing a homogeneous experience, and may be termed as *camatkāra* or delectable. Abhinavagupta also, incidentally, refers to, and dismisses, the *Sāṁkhya* view that the experience of *Rasa* leads to both pleasure and pain, since he himself believes this experience to be absolutely pleasurable, without the slightest sting and pinch of sorrow.

This, then, is, briefly, Bharata's *Rasa* theory, as understood and interpreted by the various time-honoured scholars and dramatic critics. Of the various interpretations mentioned above and discussed in detail in the following pages, that of Abhinavagupta came to be regarded, in the course of

centuries, to be perhaps the last word on the *Rasasūtra*, because of its thorough-going approach and comprehensiveness. He lent it additional weight by basing his theory on the metaphysical foundation of the *Pratyabhijnā* school of Kashmir *Śaivism* (for more details, cf. Abhinavagupta's *An Historical and Philosophical Study*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, **1963**, *Comparative Aesthetics*, Vol. I, Chowkhamba, **1959**, by K.C. Pandey, and *Sāntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics* by J.L. Masson and M.V. Patwardhan, B.O.R.I., Poona, **1969**, *pp*. 27-33.) According to Abhinavagupta, the world of drama is a beautiful creation that is made a many-splendoured thing by the literary excellences of the theme and the various theatrical accessories —a creation which is self-sufficient and constitutes a world in itself. By initiating the spectator into a very rich and significant experience, drama transports him to a new realm above the harsh realities of the everyday world, to the realm of magic, of joy. The everyday world is not negated, but surpassed or transcended, and the world of drama is, in this sense, autonomous being bound by its own laws.

Even before Abhinavagupta, the *Rasa* theory and the concept of the autonomy of art had been introduced into the field of Poetics by Ānandavardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka*, a monumental work of the ninth century. He declared *dhvani* or the suggestive, evocative power to be the very soul of poetry (cf. काव्यंस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति बुधैर्यः समाम्नातपूर्वः ।—*Dhvanyāloka*, I, *i*.). Further, this *dhvani*, he stated, is threefold : that which suggests a thought or an idea (*vastudhvani*), that which suggests an image or a figure of speech (*alaṁkāradhvani*), and that which suggests or evokes an emotion (*rasadhvani*). That poetry was regarded by him as the best (*uttamakāvya*) or *dhvanikāvya*), wherein the suggested sense (*vyaṅgyārtha*) far outshone the primary or expressed sense (*vācyārtha*). And though Ānandavardhana stated *dhvani* to be threefold, as stated above, in fact he attached the highest importance to *rasadhvani* only, and declared that the real essence of poetic

suggestion shone forth in *Rasa*, *bhāva* and their other varieties being subsumed.[5] It was once again Ānandavardhana who emphatically gave out the poet alone to be the creator of his world, with the world, turning as he would like it to.[6] Thus Abhinavagupta's emphasis on these ideas was only an elaboration of what Ānandavardhana had said about them. In fact, Ānandavardhana presented not only the theory of *dhvani* in its proper perspective, but also gave a new fillip to the theory of *Rasa*, which had been almost lost in the maze of dozens of rhetorical categories (*alaṁkāras*), promulgated by poeticians, from Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha to those of Ānandavardhana's own times. In other words, the *Rasa* theory came into its own, only when it was officially amalgamated with the *dhvani* theory.

This theory of Bharata was thus extended from the dramatic to the poetic art, since drama itself was regarded as a form of poetry—visual poetry (*dṛśyakāvya*). At the same time, it was being used for a considerably long period in Indian works on dance and music since the time of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* itself. Bharata treated dance as an integral part of drama or *nāṭya* only. Out of the four varieties of *abhinaya* or gesticulation, viz, *āṅgika* (based on bodily features), *vācika* (verbal recitation), *āhārya* (pertaining to costumes, drapery, etc.) and *sāttvika* (referring to psycho-somatic states), the *āṅgika abhinaya*, with its three aspects of *śākhā*, *aṅkura* and *nṛtta* and using a number of major and minor limbs of the body, such as the hands, the feet, the head, the eyes, the neck, etc., is declared by Bharata to be directly connected with the evocation of emotions and sentiments.[7] What is true of *Rasa* in dance is equally true of *Rasa* in the field of music. In Chapter XXIX of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Bharata gives detailed rules as to which particular *jātis* music should be related, and to which *Rasas*.[8]

However, the *Rasa* theory need not be regarded as being confined to the four arts of drama, poetry or literature,

dance and music. Eminent Indologists and art-critics, like Dr. A.K. Coomaraswamy, vouchsafe that the theory is capable of considerable extension even to other Indian arts like painting. He observes : 'It is true that this theory is mainly developed in connection with poetry, drama, dancing and music, but it is immediately applicable to art of all kinds, much of its terminology employs the concept of color, and we have evidence that the theory was also in fact applied to painting.[9] The *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* uses the term *Citrasūtra* to cover all the branches of knowledge pertaining to arts like painting, image-making dramaturgy and poetics. In Section III of this *Purāṇa* (translated into English by Stella Cramrisch, Calcutta Univ. Press, **1928**, *pp*. 9-10, etc.) it is observed that it is necessary to acquire the knowledge of Citrasūtra in order to understand the art of image-making; further Citrasūtra itself can be studied only on the basis of the knowledge of the science of dance and dance, for its part, cannot be conceived without musical instruments, while instrumental music itself follows vocal music.[10] Thus, in this view, arts like painting, image-making, drama, dance, poetry and music have something like a common denominator. It has been already remarked that philosophers, like Susanne Langer, do not subscribe to this view. In her opinion, it is better to acknowledge frankly that the arts do not have a common basis. '... ... Such candid study', she states, 'is more rewarding than the usual passionate declaration that all the arts are alike, only their materials differ, their principles are all the same, their techniques all analogous, etc. That is not only unsafe, but untrue.' (*Problems of Art*, *p*. 14). If anything is common to them, it is only their expressiveness. 'Expressiveness, in one definite and appropriate sense, is the same in all art works of any kind. What is created is not the same in any two distinct arts—this is, in fact, what makes them distinct—but the principle of creation is the same. And "living form" means the same in all of them.' (*Ibid*).

However, even Langer agrees that a work of art expresses human feeling, feeling here 'meaning *everything that can be felt*, from physical sensation, pain and comfort, excitement and repose, to the most complex emotions, intellectual tensions, or the steady feeling-tones of a conscious human life'. (*Ibid, p.* 15). If this much is agreed upon, then the various Indian arts mentioned above, viz., drama, dance, music, painting, sculpture and poetry, which mainly concern themselves with the articulation of human emotions, feelings and sentiments, may safely be said to be under the purview of the *Rasa* theory, which looks upon art as mainly the embodiment of human feeling. That the Indian writers like Bharata were conscious of arts other than poetry and drama in their writings, is also the view of Western art-critics like Philip Rawson, who opines : 'Perhaps I should mention that the Indian writers were thinking mainly of poetry and drama. But music and visual art were always considered and the code was carefully designed to cover them.'[11] Perhaps this remark should clinch the issue.

A question naturally arises regarding the validity or relevance of the *Rasa theory* in modern times. It has often been remarked that Bharata's scheme of the eight or nine *Rasas*, their *vibhāvas*, etc., is neither scientific nor comprehensive, and that it cannot hold good even for modern literature. Modern life has become extremely complicated with the growth of the machine age, the challenging problems thrown up by the two world wars, the complete upheaval in the field of human values, the stresses and strains, tensions and pulls, in various directions. So it is quite in the fitness of things that modern literature, which seeks to portray these changing circumstances in modern life, cannot be restricted within the narrow steel-frame cf the *Rasa* theory of Bharata.

To some extent this is true, as the conditions of life have no doubt vastly changed from what they were in the days of either Bharata or Abhinavagupta. The complexity of uman

life has certainly increased, and poses a great challenge to the creative writer. But what is equally relevant is that behind the imposing spectacle of the machine age and its complexities, human nature has not basically changed. Human emotions are still very much the same all over the world, and the difference lies only in the intensity with which different human beings in different parts of the world react to the new situations. Love and separation, birth and death, joy and sorrow, are still universal occasions which bring people nearer each other emotionally. The phenomenon of widespread poverty and disease is still able to draw a tear of sympathy from every human eye. Disgust and contempt towards the base and vulgar things of life are still the same for all people of refined taste. What Bharata insists upon is not so much the number of *Rasas* or *vyabhicārins* (this is amply proved by the later additions of *śānta*, *bhakti* etc., to them), but their essential presence in all human beings at all times. Human situations may change—and they will of course change—but mankind's response to them does not *basically* change, and it is this response to the situation that Bharata terms as *anubhāva*. The feeling of repulsion that we have at the description of Michaelangelo's dissection of dead bodies in Irving Stone's *The Agony and the Ecstasy* is not much different qualitatively from the one we experience when we read Mādhava's description of the fiend eating up a human corpse (*Mālatīmādhavam*, V. 16), though the context is different; both are instances of *bībhatsa*. A certain situation may appeal to our sensitivity more deeply and intensely when it evokes our basic emotions suggestively, artistically; then it becomes a situation of *Rasadhvani*. Another situation may call forth only a momentary feeling in our minds with all its paraphernalia; it becomes a situation of *Bhāvadhvani*. The importance lies in the emphasis that is placed on the situation. But as long as human emotions and human feelings continue to be the central theme of literature and art—and they will forever continue to be—the validity and the relevance of the *Rasa* theory will also be there, though the

nomenclature or the technical jargon denoting human feelings may change.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. cf. दुःखार्तानां श्रमार्तानां शोकार्तानां तपस्विनाम ।
विश्रान्तिजननं काले नाटयमेतन्मया कृतम् ॥
—*Nāṭyaśāstra* I. 114.

धर्म्यं यशस्यमायुष्यं हितं बुद्धिविवर्धनम् ।
लोकोपदेशजननं नाटयमेतद्‌भविष्यति ॥
—*Ibid* I. 115

2. cf. न तज्ज्ञानं न ताच्छ्वेतपं न सा विद्या न सा कला ।
नासौ योगोन तत्कर्म नाटयेअस्मिन्यन्न दृश्यते ॥
—*Ibid* I. 116.

योअयं स्वभावो लोकस्य सुखदुःखसमन्वितः ।
सोंअङ्गाद्यमिनयोपेतो नाटयमित्यभिधीयते ॥
—*Ibid* I. 119.

3. cf. वागङ्गामुखरागेण सत्त्वेनाभिनयेन च ।
कवेरन्तर्गतं भावं भावयन्भाव उच्यते ॥
—*Ibid* VII. 2.

बहवोअर्था विभाव्यन्ते वागङ्गाभिनयाश्रयाः ।
अनेन यस्मात्तेनायं विभाव इति संज्ञितः ॥
—*Ibid* VII. 4.

वागंगाभिनयेनेह यतस्त्वर्थोंअनुभाव्यते ।
शाखांगोपांगसंयुक्तस्त्वनुभावस्ततः स्मृतः ॥
—*Ibid* VII. 5.

4. cf. देवानामिदमामनन्ति मुनयः कान्तं क्रतुं चाक्षुषं,
रुद्रेणेदमुमाकृतव्यतिकरे स्वांगे विभक्तं द्विधा ।
त्रैगुण्योद्भवमत्र लोकचरितं नानारसं दृश्यते,
नाट्यं भिन्नरुचेर्जनस्य बहुधाऽप्येकं समाराधनम् ॥
—*Mālatimādham* I. 4.

5. cf. रसभावतदाभासतत्प्रशमशान्त्यादिरक्रमः ।
ध्वनेरात्मांगिभावेन भासमानो व्यवस्थितः ॥
—*Dhvanyā loka* II. 3.

6. cf. अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरेकः प्रजापतिः ।
यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिवर्तते ॥
Ibid, III.

7. cf. विभावयति यस्माच्च नानार्थान्हि प्रयोगतः ।
Naṭyaśāstra, VIII. 7.

शाखांगोपांगसंयुक्तस्तस्मादभिनयः स्मृतः ॥
Ibid **VIII.** 16 ab.

मुखजेऽभिनये विद्मा नानाभावरसाश्रये ।
कान्ता भयानका हास्या करुणा चाद्भुता तथा ।
रौद्री वीरा च बीभत्सा विज्ञेया रसदृष्टयः ॥
Ibid, **VIII.** 38;

also *cf.* VIII. 39, 43, 84 etc.

8. cf. *Ibid*, XXIX. 1-15.

9. cf. *Transformation of Nature in Art*, chap. **I,** *The theory of Art in Asia*', p. 46, Dover, **1956**.

10. cf. चित्रसूत्रं न जानाति यस्तु सम्यङ् नराधिप ।
—*Viṣṇudharmattapa Purańa* **III.** 2.2

अतिमालक्षणं वेत्तुं न शक्यं तेन कर्हिचित ॥

—*Ibid*. **III.** 2.3

विना तु नृष्यत्तशास्त्रेण चित्रसूत्रं सुदुर्विदम् ।

—*Ibid*. **III.** 2.5

आतोद्येन विना नृत्यं विद्यते न कथंचन ॥
न गीतेन विना शक्यं ज्ञातुमाताद्येमप्युत ॥
गीतशास्त्रविधानज्ञः सर्वं वेत्ति यथाविधि ॥

—*Ibid* **III.** 2.7

11 cf. **An Exalted Theory of Ornament** in *Aesthetics in the Modern World*, ed. Harold Osborne, Thames and Hudson, London, 1968, *pp*. 223-4.

2

RASASUTRA

THE Rasasūtra in the Sixth Adhyāya of Bharata's *Naṭyaśāstra*, viz., विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः, along with Abhinavagupta commentary, *Abhinavabhāratī* on it, has been regarded as the classic exposition of the theory of Indian Aesthetics. In the course of this commentry, and to the lesser extent, in the *Locana* commentary on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*, Abhinavagupta elaborates not only his own and Bharata's views on the theory of *Rasa* or aesthetic joy, but also those of his predecessors, viz., Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śrī Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and the Sāṁkhya writers. In fact, whatever earliest reliable information we gather about the views of these theoreticians. is exclusively from the *Abhinavabhāratī*. Hence a detailed study of these views and of that of Abhinavagupta himself, is indispensable for a complete and comprehensive idea of the Indian theory of aesthetic joy.

BHAṬṬA LOLLAṬA

Thus according to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, the first commentator mentioned by Abhinavagupta, the production, i.e., *niṣpatti*, of *Rasa* (aesthetic delight or relish) takes place from the combination of the *sthāyin* with the *vibhāvas*, etc., i.e., the vibhāvas, the Anubhāvas and the vyabhicārins. The idea

is that aesthetic delight results from the operation of (*i*) the constituents or stimulants of an emotional situation, (*ii*) the resulting reactions in terms of mental and physical conditions, and (*iii*) the transient feelings, on the *sthāyin* (विभावादिभि: संयोगोअथति स्थायिनस्ततो रसनिष्पत्ति : —*Abhinavabhāratī*). It appears that according to Lollaṭa, the *vibhāvas*, etc., operate primarily on the *sthāyin* or the sentiment of the original character enacted in a drama (*anukārya*). Naturally, the resultant aesthetic delight should also belong to the original character. What we see on the stage is primarily the emotion of a character like Rāma or Duṣyanta or Romeo for another character like Sītā or Śakuntalā or Juliet as represented against a particular environment. The emotion becomes relishable in our eyes because of its physical and mental reactions on the character, and also because of the paraphernalia of the associations of ideas, feelings, etc., entering the mind of the character in that particular situation. Thus the entire picture of the thoughts and feelings, actions and reactions of a character in a significant situation gives us his emotion. The emotion is also produced in the actor because of the strength of his identification with the original character (स चोभयोअप्यनुकार्मेअनुकर्तर्यपि चानुसंधानबलादिति । —*Abhinavagupta*). Thus, indirectly Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa also underlines the necessity of the actor's identification with the role, without which his emotional experience is impossible.

In addition to this central fact of *Rasa* arising in the original character, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa also elucidates the exact role of the various factors in an emotional situation. The *vibhāvas* or stimulants are, in his opinion, responsible for stirring up or arousing the particular mental state of the nature of *ṣthāyin* or sentiment. The *śthāyin* is already there in the subconscious mental sphere of the character, and it is called up by a particular significant situation (तत्र विभावाश्चित्त वृत्ते: स्थाय्यात्मिकाया उत्पत्तौ कारणम् ।). Further, the reactions of the character that are significant in an emotional situation are not those that follow the situation, but those that precede it or lead upto it

(अनुभावाश्च न रसजन्या अत्र विवक्षिताः, तेषां रसकारणत्वेन गणनानर्हत्वात्, अपि तु भावानामेव येऽनुभावः ।). Thus, it is Rāma's reactions on seeing Sītā in the pandal of the *Svayamvara* (selection of the bride-groom by the girl herself) ceremony that are important for getting a glimpse of his emotion, and not the reactions after the emotion is produced in his mind. The accompanying transient feelings like joy, eagerness, doubt, etc., are also mental states; but they are not on the same level as the *sthāyin*, because the *sthāyin* is in the form of subliminal or latent impressions (व्यभिचारिणश्च चित्तवृत्त्यात्मकत्वाद्यद्यपि न सहभाविनः स्थायिना, तथापि वासनात्मतेह तस्य विवक्षिता ।), whereas the transient feelings are actually revealed. The situation is parallel to the preparation of a tasty drink prepared from various ingredients, where some are vital and others are flexible (दृष्टान्तेऽपि व्यञ्जनादिमध्ये कस्यचिद्वासनात्मकता स्थायिवदन्यस्योद्भूतता व्यभिचारिवत् ।).

Abhinavagupta further remarks that this view of Lollaṭa is also the view held by elderly rhetoricians, and quotes Dandin, who maintains that *śthāyibhāvas*, like *rati* or *kopa*, reach the state of a *Rasa* like *śṛṅgāra* or *raudra* when they are heigh-tened or intensified (चिरंतनानां चायमेव पक्षः । तथा हि दण्डिना स्वालङ्कार-लक्षणेऽभ्यधायि ... ... रौद्रात्मतां गतः इत्यादि च ।).

The exact position of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa with regard to *Rasa* boils down to this : (*i*) *Rasa* is produced as a result of the combination of the *śthāyin* with the stimulants of a significant emotional situation, its reactions on the character who is the focus of the situation, and the accompanying mental states or feelings; (*ii*) the *Rasa* properly belongs to the character in question—the *anukārya*—and secondly to the actor playing the role because of his identification with the said character; (*iii*) heightened or accumulated *śthāyin* is *Rasa*. It has been generally believed that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa does not account for the apprehension of *Rasa* by the spectator or the aesthete—the *śāmājika*; however Mammaṭa, while expounding the view of Lollaṭa, does say that *Rasa* is apprehended in the character and the actor (*cf.* मुख्यया वृत्त्या रामादावनुकार्ये तद्रूपतानुसंधानान्नर्तकेऽपि

अतीयमानो रस:इति भट्टलोल्लटअमृतय: । —*Kāvyāprakāsā Uttāsa* IV). The question then is : 'apprehendcd by whom?' and the implied answer seems to be : 'by the *sāmājika*.' What was the authority that Mammaṭa to make this statement? Abhinavagupta ce tainly does not say so in his discussion of Lollaṭa's view. The position is really intriguing.

ŚAṄKUKA'S CRITICISM OF LOLLAṬA

Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's account of *Rasa* is severely criticized by Śrī Śaṅkuka, as mentioned by Abhinavagupta. In the first place, says Śaṅkuka, there are no valid grounds to infer the existence of the *sthāyin* as long as it does not come into contact with the *vibhāvas*, etc. (विभावाद्ययोगे स्थायिनो लिङ्गाभावेनावगत्यनुपपत्तेः ।). Conjoined with them, the *sthāyin* might turn into the *Rasa*; its existence can be inferred on their basis. But how can the existence of the *sthāyin* be inferred before the conjunction ? And further, how can it be known at all, if it cannot be inferred ? What cannot be known or apprehended cannot also be the subject of any assertion. In simple words, Lollaṭa has to prove the existence of the *sthāyin* before he can say that it is conjoined with the *vibhāvas*, etc. That existence cannot obviously be proved. Secondly, if, according to Bharata, the *sthāyin* is transformed into *Rasa* as a result of its conjunction with the various *bhāvas* or mental states like the *vibhāvas*, etc., it is more natural to expect Bharata first to discuss the nature of the *bhāvas* and then the nature of *Rasa*, to follow the logical order (भावानां पूर्वमभिधेयताअसङ्गात् ।). But what Bharata has actually done is just the opposite. That is enough to show that in Bharata's opinion what deserves precedence is the *Rasa*, and not the various *bhāvas*, as Lollaṭa seems to suggest. Further, if *sthāyin* is the same as *Rasa* in its latent or unintensified form, as Lollaṭa maintains (स्थायीत्वनुपचित: ।), no purpose would be served by giving a separate definition of *sthāyin* after *Rasa* has been defined (स्थितदशायां लक्षणान्तरवैयथ्यत्रि). However, this is

what Bharata has in fact done. That itself means that *sthāyin* is not the same as *Rasa*.

The remaining four objections of Śaṅkuka are based on Lollaṭa's theory that *sthāyin*, when accumulated or intensified by the *vibhāvas*, etc., becomes *Rasa*. This accumulation must be taking place gradually or by degrees. There may be moments when the accumulation is slow, very slow or extremely slow, or neither slow nor fast, and so on. In that case even the rise of *Rasa* will have to be held as taking place in respective degrees, which totally goes against the doctrine that *Rasa* is one homogeneous entity or process, and does not admit of any division (मन्दतरतममाध्यस्थाद्यानन्त्यापत्ते: ।). If, to circumvent this difficulty, *Rasa* is held to be the last stage of the accumulation of the *sthāyin*, the six divisions of *hāsya* that Bharata gives later in this very Adhyāya, viz., *smita*, *hasita*, *vihasita*, *upahasita*, *apahasita* and *atihasita* (*Nāṭyaśastra*, VI.52) would be impossible in the very nature of things (हास्यरसे षोढात्वाभावआप्ते: ।). All of these divisions cannot certainly be produced at the highest stage of the accumulation of *sthāyin*. Further, the stages of the accumulation of the *sthāyin* being innumerable, the stages of a *Rasa* like *śṛṅgāra* can also be innumerable, culminating in so many particular *Rasas* and *bhāvas*, and not confined to the ten stages mentioned traditionally (कामावस्थासु दशस्वसंख्यरसभावादि-असङ्गात् ।) Lastly, it is a fact of observation that in case of a *Rasa* like *karuṇa*, the intensity of emotion actually decreases in course of time, instead of increasing, as Lollaṭa maintains. Similarly, *sthāyins*, like *krodha* (anger), *utsāha* (enthusiasm) and *rati* (love, passion) are actually seen to decrease in the absence of resultant feelings or actions like wrath, stability and service (or attendance) respectively (शोकस्य अथमं तीव्रत्वं कालात्तु मान्द्यदर्शनं क्रोधोत्साहरतीनाभर्षस्थैर्यसेवाविपर्यये हासदर्शनमिति विपर्ययस्य दृश्यमानत्वाच्च ।). In the face of all these facts of experience, it is sheer boldness to maintain that *Rasa* is the accumulated stage of the *sthāyin*.

Thus, it would appear that Śaṅkuka's criticism of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's theory centres round three pivotal points namely : (*i*) there is no means to infer the *sthāyin* in the absence of the *vibhāvas*, etc.; (*ii*) Bharata's separate treatment of *Rasas* and *bhāvas* militates against the equation of *sthāyin* and *Rasa*; (*iii*) once we say that *Rasa* is accumulated *sthāyin*, we enter into the predicament of the stages of the accumulation of the *sthāyin* as well as the *Rasa*. However, both Śaṅkuka and Abhinavagupta have not given Lollaṭa any credit for his two very remarkable insights into the nature of *Rasa*, viz. : (*i*) that it is primarily the emotion of the original character in the story (*anukārya*) that the actor tries to convey to the spectator, and (*ii*) that the actor can achieve this only when he merges himself in the personality of the character, viz., in his role. The second insight greatly emphasizes the importance of the actor's training, his skill and equipment, as much as his capacity to allow himself to be overwhelmed by his role, irrespective of personal circumstances, handicaps, etc. Perhaps Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa was the first among the extant commentators of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* to realise the importance of the actor in the process of *Rasa* and its gesticulation, and in the opinion of a number of scholars, his view of *Rasa* perhaps comes nearer to Bharata's own view than that of any other commentator.

ŚRĪ ŚAṄKUKA

After having thus criticised Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's theory of *Rasa*, Śrī Śaṅkuka advances his own view in the matter. Accord- to him, though the *sthāyin* itself is *Rasa*, it is not the *sthāyin* belonging to the character in the play, nor does the apprehension or realization of *Rasa* belong to that same character, as Lollaṭa maintains. The *sthāyin* here appears to belong to the actor, and it is of the nature of the imitation of the *sthāyin* of the character. Because it is an imitation of the character's *sthāyin*, it has been styled with a specific name as '*Rasa*' (स्थायी भावो मुख्यरामादिगतस्थाय्यनुकरणरूपोअनुकरणरूपत्वादेव च नामान्तरेण

व्यपदिष्टो रस: ।) It is an imitation of the *sthāyin* of Rāma, etc., and not the genuine *sthāyin*. Hence, the propriety of a new designation.

Now the problem is : what are the circumstances leading to this fallacious aprehension of *Rasa* based on the actor's imitation of the character's *sthāyin ?* Śaṅkuka's reply is that the normal factors of causation in the world apply here also, but as belonging to the actor, and not as belonging to the character. These factors which are normally known as the causes, the effects and the auxiliaries, are designated here as the *vibhāvas*, the *anubhāvas* and the *vyabhicārins* respectively. In the circumstances or situation of the original person like Rāma, Duṣyanta, etc., they are of course natural. But in the case of the actor they are not natural, but acquired. However, a skilful actor displays them so convincingly that they are felt by the spectator as absolutely natural, and not as artificial (तस्माद्धेतुभिर्विभावाख्यै: कार्यैश्चानुभावात्माभि: सहचारिरूपैश्च व्यभिचारिभि: अयत्नार्जिततया कृत्रिमैरपि तथानभिमन्यमानैरनुकर्तृस्थत्वेन लिंगबलत: अतीयमान: स्थायी भावो—।)

Śaṅkuka here goes into some interesting details as to the exact way in which a particular emotional situation is enlivened before the eyes of the spectators as a result of the conglomeration of a number of factors. So far as the environment—human and non-human (or material), is concerned, the play itself prevides it. The first part of the process of *Rasa* apprehension starts with the dramatist's picturesque and powerful description of the stimulants of a particular situation (a heroine like Śakuntalā appearing before Duṣyanta in the background of the sylvan beauty of the forest, watering the plants as tender, blooming and youthful as herself, whispering innocent mischiefs to her girl friends and being teased by them—this picture itself is capable of arousing the spectator's attention, and focussing it on the situation). To add to that, there is the exquisite skill of the actor, acquired through his long training in the art of gesticulation and

exhibited through his intonations, his expressive gestures, and perhaps also through his dance and song. The actor is the most crucial factor in this process of *Rasa*. The transitory feelings like doubt, eagerness, anxiety, etc., are also enacted by the actor on the strength of his emotional reactions, as acquired (विभावा हि काव्यबलादनुसंधेया, अनुभावा: शिक्षात:, व्यभिचारिण: कृत्रिमनिजानुभावार्जनबलात् ।) Thus, the whole setting of the significant emotional situation is ready for the spectator, who apprehends it primarily on the strength of the actor's imitation of the character's sentiment.

If the *vibhāvas*, etc., are thus to be created from the poem or the actor's skill, etc., as Śaṅkuka says, what about the *sthāyin* or the sentiment of the character itself ? Is that also provided by the poem or the play ? Śaṅkuka replies that the *sthāyin* is not provided by the play, but it is all the while implied (स्थायी तु काव्यबलादपि नानुसंधेय: ।). Words like 'love', 'grief', etc., convey the sentiment only directly, but fail to suggest it through verbal gesticulation (रति: शोक इत्यादयो हि शब्दा रत्यादिकमभिधेयीकुर्वन्त्यभिधानत्वेन, न तु वाचिकाभिनयरूपतयाअवगमयन्ति ।). Now, verbal gesticulation is not simply articulation of words, but what is suggested or conveyed with the help of words, just as bodily gesticulation is not the display of limbs, but what is conveyed in a meaningful manner through bodily gestures (न हि वागेव वाथिकमपि तु तया निर्वृत्तम्, अंगेंरिवांगकम् ।). Śaṅkuka illustrates this point with a few instances which show that the direct mention of words showing a sentiment does not exactly bring out the sentiment itself, which may be brought out even without the explicit mention of it. The art of gesticulation is nothing but this power of suggestion, and it is quite different from the power of expression or direct connotation (अवगमनशक्तिह्र्यभिनयनं वाचकत्वादन्या ।). Hence, it is, Śaṅkuka affirms, that the word '*sthāyin*' has not been mentioned in Bharata's *Rasasūtra* even in a different case (अत एव स्थायिपदं सूत्रे भिन्नविभाक्तिकमपि नोक्तम् ।). As it is implied in tne actor's gesticulation, and not directly mentioned in words, so it is done in Bharata's formula also.

Thus the *sthāyin* of the character being imitated by the actor leads to *Rasa*, and hence the *Rasa*, 'love' consists of the sentiment '*rati*' (passion), and results from it (तेन रतिरनुक्रियामाणा श्रृंगार इति तदात्मकत्वं तत्प्रभवत्वं चोक्तम् ।).

One may have a doubt here, as to whether the spectator's apprehension of *Rasa* based on this illusion of the actor imitating the character's *sthāyin*, is real or valid apprehension, or is itself an illusion. This presents no difficulty for Śaṅkuka, who maintains that genuine action can result even from false knowledge or an illusion (अर्थक्रियापि मिथ्याज्ञानाद दृष्टा ।). Just to give a traditional instance, one may be tempted by the lustre or dazzle of a gem and still find the gem itself, because even the lustre cannot exist in the absence of the gem; yet the illusion or 'analogue' of the original sentiment may lead to real aesthetic delight. In fact, Śaṅkuka maintains that the peculiar apprehension that the spectator gets is of the identification of the actor with the character particularly situated, as 'That Rāma who is happy is this one'. We do not feel that the actor in this particular case is happy, nor that the actor himself is Rāma, nor again, that Rāma is not happy, nor that the actor corresponds to Rāma (न चाम नर्तक एव सुखीति अतिपत्तिः, नाप्ययमेव राम इति, न चाप्ययं न सुखीति, न चापि तत्सदृश इति, किन्तु यः सुखी रामः असावयमिति अतीतिरस्ति ।). Plainly speaking, the cognition of the spectator defies all possible modes of worldly experience through appropriate percepts and concepts. It is peculiar, extraordinary, unique. It is neither doubt nor similarity, nor dissimilarity and nor is it fullfledged conviction of identity, though it is knowledge of identity. The apprehension that the spectator gets is one unified, coherent experience, and it cannot be challenged by any canons of logic (युक्तया पर्यनुयुज्येत स्फुरन्ननुभवः कया ।।).

What Śaṅkuka maintains can be best illustrated with the maxim of the 'picture-horse', mentioned by Mammaṭa in this connection (*Citrauraganyāya Kāvyaprakāsā Ullāsa* IV), and probably made current by Śaṅkuka himself, though not

mentioned in this place. A picture-horse cannot be totally identified with a real horse, nor can it be denied being similar to the real horse. It is real as a picture, but unreal as a living animal, that is to say, it is neither totally true nor totally false, neither beyond the province of truth nor that of falsity. It is an analogue—a semblance. In other words, the ontological status of the sentiments depicted in a play has no significance, so far as the spectator's aesthetic delight is concerned.

BHAṬṬA TAUTA'S CRITICISM OF ŚAṄKUKA

Abhinavagupta's criticism of Śrī Śaṅkuka's theory is mainly based on its refutation by his own teacher, Bhaṭṭa Tauta, who declares that the theory lacks in a substantial base, and does not stand a critical inquiry (तदिदमप्यन्तस्तत्त्वशून्यं न विमर्दक्षममित्युपाध्याया: ।). Tauta would like to know whether the theory that '*Rasa* is of the nature of imitation', is based on the apprehension of the aesthete, or on that of the actor, or on an objective rationalistic approach, or in keeping with the dicta of sage Bharata (तथा हि-अनुकरणरूपो रस इति यदुच्यते तत्किं सामाजिकअतीत्यभिआयेण, उत नटाभिआयेण, किंवा वस्तुवृत्तविवेचकण्याख्यातृबुद्धिसमवलम्बर्नन यथाहु: 'व्याख्यातार: खत्वेवं विवेचयन्ति, इति, अथभरतमुनिवचनानुसारेण ।). In fact, he wants to show that all these four alternatives are equally untenable.

The very first alternative, viz., Śaṅkuka's theory has the spectator's apprehension as its central point and is discussed and rejected by Bhaṭṭa Tauta in an exhaustive manner. When something is called an imitation of anything else, it must first be capable of proof. For instance, we see somebody drinking water, imitating the drinking of liquor, and we say, 'This is how he drinks liquor.' Here the drinking of water is a matter of direct perception (आद्य:पक्षोअसंगत: । किंचिद्धि अमाणेनोपलब्धं तदनुकरणमिति शक्यं वक्तुम् । यथा एवमसौ सुरां पिबतीति सुरापानानुकरणत्वेन पय:पानं अत्यक्षावलोकितं अतिभाति ।).

Now the point is : what is there about the actor that appears

as an imitation ? (इह च नटगतं किं तदुपलब्धं सदनुकरणतया भातीति चिन्त्यम् ।). Certainly the actor's person (or features), or the head dress, horripilation, tremor, the movements and tossings of arms, the knitting of the eyebrows, glances, etc. belonging to it does not appear to anybody as being the imitation of the sentiment of love of the character, as love is a mental state, and these things are physical, perceived by different senses and as belonging to a different substratum (i.e. actor), and hence entirely different from that love (तच्छरीरं तन्निष्ठं अतिशीर्षकादि रोमाञ्च-गद्गदिकादि भुजाक्षेपवलनअभृतिभ्रक्षेपकटाक्षादिकं च न रतैश्चित्तवृत्ति रूपतयानुकारत्वेन कस्य-चिअतिभाति । जडत्वेन भिन्नेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वेन भिन्नाधिकरणत्वेन च ततोअतिवैलक्षण्यात् ।). Further, the imitation of an object is apprehended on the basis of that of the self-same object, as it obtains in reality. Nobody has previously seen the sentiment of love as belonging to Rāma, and hence even the misconception that the actor imitates Rāma is also automatically disproved (मुख्यावलोकने च तदनुकरणअतिभासः । न च रामगतां रतिमुपलब्धपूर्विणः केचित् । रातेन रामानुकारो नट इत्यपि निरस्तः अवादः ।).

Bhaṭṭa Tauta now takes up another point suggested by Śaṅkuka. According to this, an aesthetic emotion or *Rasa* like *śṛṅgāra* would be the mental state of the actor only, being apprehended by the spectator as the imitation of the *sthāyin* of '*rati*' (love) of the character. In that case, Tauta says, we must find out what the exact nature of the apprehension of the mental state of the actor is (अध नटगता चित्तवृत्तिरेव अतिपन्ना सती रत्यनुकारः शृंगार इन्युच्यते तत्रापि किमात्मकत्वेन सा अतीयत इति चिन्त्यम् ।). It may be said in reply that the actor's mental state appears in the same form of apprehension as the normal worldly mental state like love, having the nature of a cause because of stimulants like the presence of young women, etc., the nature of an effect because of resultants like glances, etc., and the nature of an auxiliary because of ancillary factors like pleasure, etc., serving as indicative causes. In that case, Tauta goes on, it is apprehended as the normal state of the *sthāyin* 'love' only. Where is the propriety of the jugglery of words, manifest in the expression,

'It is the imitation of love'? (ननु अमदादिभि: कारणैः कटाक्षादिभि: कार्यैर्नुत्यादिभि: सहचारिभिर्लिंगभूतैर्या लौकिकी कार्यरूपा कारणरूपा सहचारिरूपा च चित्तवृत्ति: अतीतियोग्या तदात्मकत्वेन सा नटाचित्तवृत्ति :अतिभाति। हन्त तर्हि रत्याकारेणैव सा अतिपन्नेति दूरे रत्यनुकरणतावाचोयुक्ति: ।).

Śaṅkuka might try to explain the matter by saying that the *vibhāvas*, etc., of the character and of the actor are not the same, inasmuch as they are real in the character, while unreal in the actor. (ननु ते विभावादयोअनुकार्ये पारमार्थिका:, इह त्वनुकर्तरि न तथेति विशेष: ।). If it is so, and if they are projected as artificial on the strength of the poem, the actor's training etc., without being the causes or the effects or the auxiliaries of the actor's *sthāyin* like 'love', Tauta enquires: are they apprehended by the spectator as artificial or not? If they are apprehended as *artificial*, how can they lead to the *real* apprehension of love? (अस्त्वेवम् किं तु ते हि विभावादयोअतत्कार णातत्कार्यतित्सहचारिरूपा अपि कान्यशिक्षादिबलोपकल्पिता: कृत्रिमा: सन्त: किं कृत्रिमत्वेन सामाजिकैगृह्यिन्ते न वा। यदि गृह्यन्ते तदा तैः कथं रतेखगति: ।). To this Śaṅkuka may reply that because they do not lead to real apprehension of love by themselves, being artificial, they become the cause of the apprehension of the imitation of love (नन्वत एव तत्अतीयमानं रत्यनुकरणबुद्धे कारणम् ।). This explanation is also totally rejected by Bhaṭṭa Tauta. If effects arise from various causes, and if a well-informed person knows this, he can naturally infer the existence of another cause (*other than the usual one*). However, an ignorent person who does not know the fact (*of many causes*) can naturally infer only the well-known cause (*and not others*). For example, a particular species of scorpions can lead to the inference of cowdung only and not to the inference of another scorpion, which is wrong (तन्न। कारणान्तरअभवेषु हि कार्येषु सुशिक्षितेन तथा ज्ञाने वस्त्वन्तरस्यानुमानं तावद्युक्तम्। असुशिक्षितेन तु तस्यैव असिद्धस्य कारणस्य। यथा वृश्चिकविशेषाग्दोमयस्यैवानुमानम्। वृश्चिकस्यैव तत्परं मिथ्याज्ञानम् ।). Further, Tauta observes that where the knowledge of the indicative cause is wrong, the inference of something possessing a similar appearance also does not stand to reason. To illustrate the point, if vapour is apprehended as smoke, the indicative cause which appears to

resemble or imitate it, does not warrant the inference resembling that object (i.e., smoke). Thus if fog is apprehended as resembling smoke, it is not found to lead to the apprehension of the China rose-flower resembling fire (यत्रापि लिंगज्ञानं मिथ्याततामि न तदाभासानुमानं युक्तम् । न हि बाष्पाद्धूमत्वेन ज्ञत्रतामनुकारअतिभासमानादपि लिंगाचदनुकारानुमानं युक्तम् । धूमानुकारत्वेन हि ज्ञायमानान्नीहारान्नाग्न्यनुकारजपापुष्पअतीतिदृष्टा ।). The idea is that imaginary causes cannot give rise to real effects. Smoke may lead to the inference of fire, but fog resembling smoke cannot lead to the inference of the China rose resembling fire. If it is said for the sake of argument that the actor's sentiment of love produces the apprehension of *Rasa* in the spectator, it has at least a point in it. But if it is said that the actor's imitation of the character's sentiment leads to *Rasa*, it must be said to be a far cry.

Śaṅkuka might further try to save the situation by saying that an actor appears as angry, though he is not in fact angry: this is by virtue of imitation only (नन्वक्रुद्धोअपि नटः क्रुद्ध इव भाति ।). Bhaṭṭa Tauta's reply to this is that the actor appears angry in the sense that he appears like one who is angry. Further, the resemblance is conveyed by the knitted eyebrows, etc., just as a bull appears like a *Gavaya* (a peculiar species of ox) because of his mouth, etc. Now this has nothing to do with imitation (सत्यम्, क्रुद्धेन सदृशः । सादृश्यं च भ्रुकुटयादिभिः गोरिव गवयेन मुखादिभिरिति नैतावतानुकारः कश्चित् ।). Even Śaṅkuka would agree that the spectators do not have the apprehension of the actor's resemblance with the character (न चापि सामाजिकानां सादृश्यमतिरस्ति ।). On the one hand, he maintains that the spectators do not have the apprehension of the actor's sentiment, whereas, on the other, he also asserts that what is apprehended by the spectators is the actor's imitation; the whole argument appears to be hollow (सामाजिकान्गं च भावशून्या नर्तके अतिपत्तिरित्युच्यते, अथ च तदनुकारअतिभास इति रिक्ता वाचोयुक्तिः ।)

Śaṅkuka had declared the spectator's apprehension to be of the form—'This is Rāma'. If this has been ascertained at a

particular moment of the play,why should it not be accepted as the correct apprehension in the absence of a future sublator ? Or, provided there is a sublator, why should it not be declared as false knowledge? (यच्चोक्तं रामोऽयमित्यस्ति अतिपत्तिः, तदपि यदि तदात्वे निश्चितं तदुत्तर कालभाविबाधकवैभुर्याभावे कथं न तत्त्वज्ञानं स्यात्, बाधकसद्भावे वा कथं न मिथ्याज्ञानम् ।). In fact, it would be a case of false knowledge, even if there is no sublator—nothing to disprove it (वास्तवेन चवृतेन बाधकानुदयेऽपि मिथ्याज्ञाननुमेव स्यात् ।). The idea is that there is no justification in Śaṅkuka's assertion that the spectator does not have a contradictory experience of various apprehensions (तेन विरुद्धबुद्धसंभेदादित्यसत् ।). The contradictions do exist. Even the apprehension—'This is Rāma', takes place with reference to another actor also. Thus, what results is a class—characteristic of 'being Rāma' (नर्तकान्तरेऽपि रामोऽयमिति अतीतिरस्ति । ततश्च रामत्वं सामान्यरूपमित्यायातम् ।).

In the course of his argument Śaṅkuka had stated that the *vibhāvas* or stimulants are understood from poetry (viz., drama). Tauta declares that this is something which he fails to comprehend, since the actor can never have an apprehension like—'This Sītā is somebody to me' (यच्चोच्यते विभावाः काव्यादनुसंधीयन्ते तदपि न विद्मः । न हि ममेयं सीता काचिदिति स्वात्मीयत्वेन अतिपत्तिर्नटस्य ।). In other words, the *vibhāvas* do not belong to him. If the said availability of the *vibhāvas* means only that they are made fit to be apprehended as such by the spectators, then, as Tauta suggests, the idea of availability should more properly apply to the sentiment or *sthāyin* rather than to the *vibhāvas*, since it is the *sthāyin* that the spectators mainly apprehend as—'This belongs to him' (i.e., to the character) (अथ सामाजिकस्य तथा अतीतियोग्याः झियन्त इत्येतदेवानुसंधानमुच्यते तर्हि स्थामिनि सुतरामानुसंधानं स्यात् । तस्यैव हि मुख्यत्वेन आस्मिन्नयमिति सामाजिकानां अतिपत्तिः ।).

Śaṅkuka had also made a great fuss about what is of the nature of gesticulation and what is non-gesticulation in the drama, saying that words themselves do not exhaust the range of verbal gesticulation, etc. Bhaṭṭa Tauta reserves the reply to this point for its proper place (यत्तु वाग्वाचिकमित्यादिना

भेदाभिधानसंरम्भगर्भमभिनयानभिनयरूपताविवेक: कृत: स उत्तरभ स्वावसरे चर्चयिष्यते ।). The discussion appears in the Fourteenth Adhyāya of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Thus, Tauta, completely rules out the possibility of *Rasa* being the actor's imitation of the character's sentiment from the point of view of the spectator's apprehension (तस्मात्सामाजिकप्रतीत्यनुसारेण स्थाय्यनुकरणं रस इत्यसत् ।).

Now, Bhaṭṭa Tauta takes up the second possibility in Śaṅkuka's view, viz., that the imitation of the character's *sthāyin* is done from the actor's point of view. In the first place, Tauta points out the actor is not quite conscious that he is imitating Rāma or his mental state (न चापि नटस्येत्थं प्रतिपत्ति: रामं तच्चित्तवृत्तिं वानुकरोमीति ।). The word 'imitation' (*anukaraṇa*) itself can be understood in two different ways. If it means 'doing something as another does', then obviously it is not possible in the case of the actor, who has not come across the original character (सदृशकरणं हि तावदनुकरणमनुपलब्धप्रकृतिना न शक्यं कर्तुम् ।). Or, if it means, 'doing after somebody else has done', then such kind of imitation pervades the whole world (अथ पश्चात्करणमनुकरणं तल्लोकेऽप्यनुकरणात्मतातिप्रसक्ता ।). Then what is the speciality of the actor's imitation? He is only one of innumerable men who have been doing things which Rāma is supposed to have done. To escape this difficulty that it cannot be Rāma's imitation in either sense, Śaṅkuka may say that the actor does not want to imitate a particular person like Rāma, but he thinks that he is imitating the sentiment of sorrow of some noble person. Here the point to ponder over is: with what does he imitate the noble person's sorrow? Certainly not with his own sorrow, since the actor does not experience sorrow. Nor can the shedding of tears, etc., be said to be the imitation of sorrow, as they have already been stated to be two different things (अथ न नियतस्य कस्यचिदनुकार:, अपि तूत्तमप्रकृते: शोकमनुकरोमीति तर्हिकेनेति चिन्त्यम् । न तावच्छोकेन तस्य तदभावात् । न चाश्रुपातादिना शोकस्यानुकार: तद्वैलक्षण्यादित्युक्तम् ।). The only possibility is this, that the actor may think that he is imitating the resultant actions of sorrow proper in the case of a man of noble nature (इयत्तु स्यात्-उत्तमप्रकृतेर्ये शोकानुभावासनानानुकरी-

मीति ।). Even then the problem still remains : resultants of which man of noble nature ? If they are the resultants of anybody's sorrow, how is it possible to have his idea without any particularity ? 'Anybody who weeps like this may be the said person'—may be the reply. But then even the actor's self may be brought into the picture, and in that case the relation of the imitated and the imitator will be dropped i.e., the actor will be imitating his own *anubhāvas* or resultants, which is ridiculous (तत्रापि कस्योत्तमअकृते: । यस्य कस्यचिदितिचेत् सोअपि विशिष्टतां विना कथं बुद्धावारोपयितु शक्य: । य एवं रोदितीति चेत्स्वात्मापिमध्ये नटस्यानुअविष्ट इति गलितोअनुकार्यानुकर्तभाव: ।). The idea of the actor's apprehension is conveyed only in the sense that he operates, displaying the resultant actions on the strength of his training, the memory of his own stimulants or *vibhāvas*, and because of the harmony of his heart through the generalization or universalization of his mental state, and reciting the poem with the proper accompaniments of correct intonations, etc., not that he conveys the idea of imitation. Bhaṭṭa Tauta further stresses the fact that the imitation of Rāma's behaviour is not an external fact like the imitation of the lover's dress—something which has already been shown in the First Adhyāya of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (किं च नट: शिक्षावशात् स्वविभाव स्मरणाधित्त वृत्ति साधारणीभावेन हृदयसंवादात्केवलमनुभावान्अदर्शयन् काव्यमुचितकाकु-अभृत्युपस्कारेण पठंश्चेष्टत इत्येतावन्मात्रे अतीतिं न त्वनुकारं वेदयते । कान्तवेषानुकार-वद्धि न रामचेष्टितस्यानुकार: । एतच्च अथमाध्यायेअपि दार्शतिमस्माभि: ।)

The third possibility of imitation according to Saṅkuka was the rationalistic or philosophical approach, that which distinguishes between the object as it is and as it appears. Here Abhinavagupta briefly points out that what is not cognized cannot be called as the objective fact (नापि वस्तुवृत्तानु-सारेण तदनुकारत्वम्, असंवेद्यमानस्य वस्तुवृत्तत्वानुपपत्ते: ।). The sentiment of the original character being something which is beyond the ken of our direct apprehension or cognition, the imitation of that sentiment is still more improbable. As to what the objective fact or the philosophical position regarding the apprehension of the character's sentiment is, will be made

clear later on (यच्च वस्तुवृत्तं तद्‌शीयष्याम: ।). Here Abhinavagupta perhaps hints at his own exposition of *Rasa* and *sthāyin* which follows later.

The fourth possibility regarding Saṅkuka's imitation theory was that it had the sanction of Bharata's own authority. Tauta firmly rejects the existence of any utterance of Bharata to this effect that *Rasa* is the imitation of the *sthāyin* or of the character's sentiment (न च मुनिवचनमेंवविधमस्ति क्वचित् स्थाय्यनुकरणं रसा इति।). Nor is there, he says, any positive indication in Bharata's text to warrant this kind of inference. On the contrary, as it will be discussed at the end of the Chapter on the divisions of the *sandhis* (Adhyāya XIX of the Naṭyaśāstra), Bharata's discussion of *dhruvāgāna*, the various tālas and the subordinate varieties of lāsya are a definite indication of the fact that *Rasa* is not imitation(नापिं लिगमभार्थे मुनेरुपलभ्यते अत्युत ध्रुवागानतालवौचिभ्यलास्यांगोपजीवननिरुपणं विपर्यंये लिगमिति सन्ध्यंगाध्यायान्ते वितनिष्याम: ।). But then Śaṅkuka may ask, 'What about the statement—"This drama will imitate the seven islands?" Tauta's reply is that the word 'imitate' there can be explained in a different way also (e.g., in the sense of representation, *sādrśya*). And in cases of imitation, like the imitation of the lover's dress, gait, etc., do we really come across a different name of the process ? In case of the imitation of *sthāyin*, the process comes to be known by a different name, viz, *Rasa*. This does not happen for all imitations (सप्तद्वीपानुकरणमित्यादि त्वन्यथापि शक्यगमनिकमिति। तदनुकारेअपि च क्वनामान्तरं कान्तवेषगत्यनुकरणादी ।).

Lastly, Tauta touches upon the proverbial analogy of 'the picture-horse' or 'the picture-bull'. It was said that various paints like yellow pigments, etc., give rise to a product called 'the bull'. Now if the idea— 'the bull is produced' means that the bull is displayed, it is wrong. Red lead and other paints do reveal a real bull, as it is revealed, for example, by lamps, etc., but they give rise to a particular configuration resembling the bull. It is these red lead and

other paints that become the object of our apprehension— 'This is like the bull', when they are arranged in a special manner, resembling the actual arrangement of the features of the bull. Now the conglomeration of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicārins* does not give rise to an equal apprehension— 'This is like the sentiment of love'. In other words, we are not conscious of the resemblance or difference of the *Rasa* and the *sthāyin* or sentiment. They are just one, and not one resembling the other. Thui, Tauta concludes, Śaṅkuka's contention that *Rasas* are the imitation of the character's sentiment or *sthāyin*, is false (यच्चोच्यते वर्णकेहरितालादिभि: संयुज्यमान एव गौरित्यादि, तत्र यद्यभिव्यज्यमान इत्यर्थोऽभियेत:, तदसत् । न हि सिन्दूरादिभि: पारमार्थिको गौरभिव्यज्यते अदीपादिभिरिव, किंतु तत्सदृश: समूहविशेषो निर्वर्त्यते । न एव हि सिन्दूराद्यो गवावयवसंनिवेशसदृशेन संनिवेशविशेषेणास्थिता गोसदृगिति अतिभासस्य विषय: । नैवं विभावादिसमूहो रतिसद्रृशताअतिपत्तिग्राह्य: । तस्माद्भावानुकरणं रसा इत्यसत् ।).

Bhaṭṭa Tauta's criticism of Saṅkuka's theory of imitation is no doubt very thorough and exhaustive. There is hardly any point in Śaṅkuka's view which he has left untouched and unrefuted, and very probably, Abhinavagupta wholeheartedly approves of Tauta's criticism, since at no stage has he expressed his divergence from it. The salient points of Bhaṭṭa Tauta's criticism of Śaṅkuka's theory can be briefly enumerated in this manner :

(*i*) The actor's features (or expressions), his make-up, his gestures, such as movements of arms, knitting of eye-brows, etc., cannot be said to be the imitation of the original character's mental state like love, because these things are insentient, apprehended by different sense-organs, and belonging to a substratum other than the character.

(*ii*) Imitation presupposes an original : nobody has seen Rāma's love which is to be imitated.

(*iii*) If it is said that the spectator apprehends the actor's mental state which he imitates, it onlp boils down to be the mental state only, and the question of imitation does not arise.

(*iv*) It cannot be said that the stimulants, etc., are real in the case of the character, and unreal (or artificial) in the case of the actor (and thus different). The point is : are they apprehended by the spectators as artificial or not? If they are, they cannot lead to the knowledge of the character's sentiment of love. A well-trained spectator can infer the character's real sentiment on the basis of the actor's artificial stimulants, etc., but not an untrained one.

(*v*) The appearance of the actor as angry, etc., does not mean *imitation*; it only means *resemblance*. Spectators do not have an impression of resemblance in the actor.

(*vi*) The spectator's apprehension, such as, 'This is Rāma', does not disappear till the end of the performance. It persists to the end. Hence Śaṅkuka is not justified in saying that the spectator's apprehension is neither real, nor illusory, etc.

(*vii*) The actor does not obtain the knowledge of stimulants from the poem, since he cannot relate Sītā to himself. We should rather say that they are meant to help the spectator to apprehend the sentiment of the character.

(*viii*) The actor has no definite feeling that he is imitating Rāma or his mental state. *Anukaraṇa* (imitation) may means either 'doing as another does', or 'doing after another does'. If it means the first, it requires an original, which is not available. If it means the second, it is only a common worldly occurrence. If the actor is taken to imitate some ideal character's behaviour, that

may include his imitating himself. *What the actor does is to convey the apprehension of the character, and not to convey his imitation.*

(*ix*) Bharata nowhere states that *Rasa* is the imitation of *śthāyin*. On the contrary, his discussion of *dhruvāgāna*, rhythms, dance, etc., proves that *it is just the opposite of bare, prosaic imitation of the sentiment.*

(*x*) The combination of various pigments does not produce the apprehension of a real bull (or horse). It only gives rise to a particular configuration, producing the resemblance of the bull. But stimulants, etc., produce the real apprehension of love, and not the resemblance of love. Hence *Rasa* is not the imitation of the character's sentiment or *śthāyin*.

It has been pointed out by some modern critics that Bhaṭṭa Tauta's criticism of Śaṅkuka's theory is not completely valid. For example, Tauta's point that the actor's features, gestures, etc., cannot convey the character's sentiment, has been answered by saying that it forms a part of the general objection regarding psychological observation and analysis. The concept of acting or gesticulation itself involves a reference to something beyond, which is left to the spectator's imagination. The actor and his gestures at all times point to Rāma and his gestures. Secondly, Bhaṭṭa Tauta had observed that there is no justification to believe that the actor imitates Rāma, since he has never seen Rāma, or his behaviour. To this the reply has been given that historical or mythological characters, though actually observed or not, are already deeply embedded in the popular mind; and hence, their imitation does follow a particular, set or agreed pattern. Where all the details have not been provided by the author, the actor can fill in the gaps on the strength of his own imagination. It is here that the connect of universalization steps in, especially in connection with imaginary charac-

ters (See *Saundaryamīmāṁsā* in Marathi by R.B. Patankar, 1st ed., *pp*. 262-9). Prof. Patankar also complains that Śaṅkuka's theory, which is almost a complete development of the concept of 'seeing a play' has been rather ignored. But the point is : if Śaṅkuka's theory of imitation almost borders on universalization, in what way has it an advantage over Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's or Abhinavagupta's theory (See *infra*)? If Śaṅkuka does not set much store by the ontological status of the dramatic characters, which are, so to speak, only symbolic, once again he approximates to the transcendentalist view of Abhinavagupta. Again Bhaṭṭa Tauta's criticism that there is an essential distinction between the picture and the actor's gesticulation does score a point. The configuration in the picture at best produces a resemblance of the real horse, while the stimulants in a drama, enacted by the actor, produce a real apprehension of the character's feelings, and not just their resemblance. Further, Śaṅkuka's technical jargon of logical terminology, like the use of words, *liṅga*, *anumāna*, *mithyājñāna*, etc., drags the spectator's experience nearer to a logical process of inference, rather than a common-sense view of the apprehension of the character's feelings. At the same time, Śaṅkuka deserves special credit for a number of dramatically significant observations. His emphasis on the actor's training, equipment and his skill in gesticulation is quite apt and apposite. His vivid analogue of the painted horse which takes us beyond the physical existence of the dramatic object, and his clear-cut distinction between the verbal expression of a sentiment and its dramatic representation on the state, are also things which have a considerable validity in the analysis of dramatic experience. *When he says that the actor imitates the character's sentiment, what he perhaps means is that the actor tries his best to convey the sentiment as convincingly and vividly as possible, which, for the spectator, obliterates the distinction between the original and the actor.*

THE SĀṀKHYA VIEW

The third view about *Rasa* that Abhinavagupta mentions is that of the Sāṁkhya philosophers, though it is not dealt with exhaustively. According to this view, *Rasa* is of the nature of pleasure and pain (साख्यदृशा सुखदु:खस्वभावो रसा: ।). The objective world that possesses the potency of causing pleasure and pain is itself external. The *vibhāvas* or stimulants occupy here the position of petals or external surroundings. The *anubhāvas* or resultants and the *vyabhicārins* or transient feelings replenish the physical objects. However, the *sthāyins* or sentiments (of characters), produced by these physical objects are internal and of the nature of pleasure and pain i.e., of a mixed nature (येन त्वभ्यधायि 'सुखदु:खजननशक्तियुक्ता विषयसामग्री वाह्यैव—सांख्यदृशा सुखदु:खस्वभावो रस:—तस्यां च सामग्र्यां दलस्थानीया विभावा: संस्कारका अनुभावव्यभिचारिण , स्थायिनस्तु तत्सामग्रीजन्या आन्तरा सुखदु:खस्बभावा इति ।). In other words, since the worldly experience of senses and sense objects is full of pleasure and pain, and not an unmixed one, the Sāṁkhya philosopher believes that even aesthetic experience based on these is bound to be a mixed one. They do not much distinguish between a *sthāyin* and a *Rasa*. However, Abhinavagupta does not see eye to eye with them. The Sāṁkhya philosopher has himself noticed his contradiction with Bharata's teachings that the *sthāyin* and the *Rasa* are two different concepts, and that the *sthāyins* are to be developed into *Rasa*. Hence it is that he interprets Bharata's statement to this effect figuratively, and not literally. Abhinavagupta thanks the Sāṁkhya protagonist wholeheartedly for sparing him, a man who believes in direct testimony, from the pains of exposing the Sāṁkhya absurdity in a detailed manner (तेन 'स्थायिभावान् रसत्वमुपनेष्यम:' इत्यादवुपचारमंगीकुर्वंता ग्रन्थविरोधं स्वयमेव बुध्यमानेन दूषणाविष्करणमौखर्यत्आमाणिको जन: परिरक्षित इतिकिमस्योच्यते ।). However, Abhinavagupta cannot restrain himself from pointing out one more defect inherent in the Sāṁkhya theory, and that defect refers to the disparity in the apprehension of *Rasa* (यत्त्वन्यत्अतीतिवैषम्यअसंगदि तत्कियदत्नोच्यताम्). Though Abhinavagupta is not very explicit as to the exact nature of the dispa-

rity in apprehension, it may be said to refer, perhaps, to the fact that, according to the Sāṁkhya formulation, some *Rasas* may conduce to the happiness of the spectator while others give rise to his unhappiness, thus rendering it impossible to have a one-sided and uniform aesthetic or dramatic experience. It may also refer to the disparity in the respective apprehension of motley spectators whose temperaments are themselves constituted by the three strands of illumination (*sattva*), infatuation ((*rajas*), and darkness (*tamas*) in different degrees, according to the Sāṁkhya doctrine.

BHAṬṬA NĀYAKA

The next view that Abhinavagupta takes up for criticism is that of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, and combines the elements of both Mīmāṁsā and Sāṁkhya doctrines. It appears that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka hovered between Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, since Abhinavagupta shows Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka here as refuting the doctrine of *vyañjanā* or *dhvani* (poetic suggestion) advocated by Ānandavardhana. According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, *Rasa* or aesthetic emotion in drama or poetry is neither directly apprehended, nor produced, nor again suggested (भट्टनायकस्वाह रसो न अतीयते नोत्पद्यते नाभिव्यज्यते ।). If we believe that *Rasa* is apprehended, then, according to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, it can be apprehended only in two ways : either as belonging to the spectator himself, or as belonging to someone else, Now if we believe that *Rasa* is apprehended by the spectator as belonging to himself, it may even lead to an experience of sorrow in case of an emotion like pathos (स्वगतत्वेन हि अतीतौ करूणे दु:खित्वं स्यात् ।). A spectator who witnesses a performance just to derive a kind of innocent delight would not like to make himself unhappy or miserable by witnessing a pathetic episode or situation in perceived piece. But in the light of this alternative, apprehension of *Rasa* would certainly involve an experience of joy as well as sorrow, depending on the situation. Nor would such an apprehension of *Rasa* be appropriate or desirable in the case

of the spectator, since characters like Sītā cannot act as the stimulants in his case. It is not very likely that his own beloved in real life would be the stimulant, since she does not belong to the sphere of the play. Further, the universalization or generalization of sentiments like love which operates at the human leval cannot operate at the divine level in the case of characters like Sītā. And lastly, there are some stimulants which are only possible at a divine or superhuman level, for instance, the crossing of the ocean by Rāma, and like events, which can never be generalized. For all these four reasons, the apprehension of the *Rasa* with reference to the spectator himself is impossible (न च सा अतीतिर्युक्ता सीमादेरविभावत्यात्, स्वकान्तास्मृत्यसंवेदनात्: देवतादौ साधारणीकरणायोग्यत्वात्, समुद्र लंघनादेरसाधारण्यात् ।).

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka further shows that the spectator cannot have this apprehension of *Rasa* in any other way also. It cannot be, for instance, an object of remembrance of Rāma, possessing the sentiment of love, since remembrance always requires an original object like Rāma, which is the ground of knowledge and which is absent here (न च तद्वतो रामस्य स्मृति: अनुपलब्धत्वात् ।). If we regard the apprehension as based on some means of proof like verbal testimony or inference, it would be devoid of human interest (न च शब्दानुमानादिभ्यस्तरअतीतो लोकस्य सरसता युक्ता ।). On the contrary, if we apprehend a loving couple as in reality, the spectators may be lost in a variety of mental states like shame, disgust, longing, etc., in keeping with their own different temperaments. In that case we cannot even think of human interest, as the reaction will be only a matter of personal feeling (अत्यक्षादिव नायकयुगलकावभासे हि अन्युत लज्जाजुगुप्सास्पृहादिस्वोचितचित्तवृत्यन्तरौदयग्रतया का सरसत्वकथापि स्यात् ।). Thus the apprehension of *Rasa* cannot be properly said to take the form of direct experience, remembrance, etc., (तन्न अतीतिरनुभवस्मृत्यादिरूपा रसस्य युक्ता ।). To escape these complications, we may say that the spectator apprehends the *Rasa* as belonging to someone else. In that case, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka states that the danger may be that the spectator will be

totally indifferent to another person's emotion (परगतत्वेन तु अतीतो ताटस्थ्यमेव भवेत् ।...). The same defect occurs also in the case of the production of *Rasa*(उत्पत्तावपि तुष्यमेतद् दूषणम् ।). Even if we regard *Rasa* as being originally latent in the form of a power and then being revealed or suggested, as the advocates of *dhvani* maintain, the difficulty would still arise regarding thc disparity of apprehending the object suggested (शक्तिरसत्वेन पूर्वं स्थितस्य पश्चादभिव्यक्तौ विषयार्जनतारतम्यापत्ति: ।). To add to that, there will arise the same old difficulties as to whether the *Rasa* will be apprehended with reference to the spectator himself or with reference to someone else (स्वगतपरगतत्वादि च पूर्ववद्विकल्पयम् ।).

Thus, after having explained in details how *Rasa* cannot be apprehended, produced or suggested as according to the earlier views, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's own position regarding *Rasa* is set out by Abhinavagupta in a quite terse sentence, which itself demands a detailed explanation. According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, *Rasa* or aesthetic emotion in drama and poetry goes through two stages : that of manifestation, and that of being relished. It is brought into being by a special process or function known as *bhāvakatva*(idealization or generalization). In poetry this process is characterized by the absence of flaws and the positive abundance of merits and figures; in drama it takes the form of fourfold gesticulation. The process consists of the generalization (or idealization) of the emotional apparatus used by the poet, such as stimulants, consequents, etc. It is quite different from the process of *abhidhā* or primary denotation, and it dispels the entire delusion of the spectator's mind. After this process of idealization, the *Rasa* is relished by another process known as *bhoga* or delectation. This process of delectation is quite different from the usual means of knowledge like direct experience, remembrance, etc. On account of the variety of the persistence of the elements of *rajas* and *tamas* (delusion and stupefaction) in human nature, it is of the nature of flux or fluidity, expansion and dilation. Further the delectation is also characterised by perfect repose in the spectator's own

consciousness, and the nature of this consciousness is that of the joy of illumination due to the preponderance of the element of *sattva* (purity). Lastly, the delectation approximates the relish of the bliss of Supreme Brahman (तस्मात्काव्ये दोषाभावगुणालंकारमयत्वलक्षणेन नाय्ये चतुर्विधाभिनयरुपेण निबिडनिजमीहसंकट निवारण-कारिणा विभावादिसाधारणीकरणात्मनाऽभिधातो द्वितीयेनांशेन भावकत्वव्यापारेण भाव्यमानो-रसोऽनुभवस्मृत्यादिविलक्षणेन रजस्तमोऽनुवेधवैचित्र्यबलाद् द्रुतिविस्तरविकासात्मना सत्त्यो-द्रेकअकाशानन्दमयनिजसंविद्विश्रान्तिलक्षणेन परब्रह्मास्वादसविधेन भोगेन परं भुज्यत इति ।).

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S CRITICISM OF BHAṬṬA NĀYAKA

This viewpoint of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is refuted by Abhinavagupta in two different stages. In the first stage, he criticizes Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's contention that *Rasa* is neither apprehended, nor produced, nor revealed (or suggested), by pointing out that any detailed refutation of it is just unwarranted, since it only represents Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's view, already refuted by Śaṅkuka (तत्र पूर्वपक्षोऽयं भट्टलोल्लटपक्षानभ्युपगमादेव नाभ्युपगत इति तद्दूषणमनुत्था-क्षोपहतमेव ।). One fails to understand, Abhinavagupta says, what kind of enjoyment of *Rasa* can be possible in the world, which cannot be apprehended, produced or revealed (अती-त्यादिव्यतिरिक्तश्च संसारे को भोग इति न विम: ।). If it is the same as the relish of *Rasa*, that is again an apprehension only, and it would only acquire a different name because of the difference in its means, just as one and the same process of apprehension is known by various names, as direct perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy (or comparison), intuition, etc., owing to the variety of means adopted (रसनेति चेत् सापि अतिपात्ति रेव । केवलमुपायवैलक्षण्यान्नामान्तरं अतिपद्यतां दर्शनानुमितिश्रुत्युपमिति अति-भानादिनामान्तरवत्). So there can be no relish of *Rasa* without apprehension. If the other two alternatives of the production and manifestation of *Rasa* are also rejected, there is no third course left, but to assume that either *Rasa* is eternal or that it simply does not exist (निष्पादनाभिव्यक्तिद्वयानभ्युपगमे च नित्यो वाऽसद्वा रस इति न तृतीया गति:स्यात् ।). And further, a thing which is not an

object of apprehension cannot also be an object of practical dealings (न चाअतीतं वस्त्वस्ति व्यवहारे योग्यम् ।).

Turning to the second part of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's argument, viz., his thesis that the nature of the apprehension of *Rasa* is its enjoyment or delectation and it is of the nature of fluidity, expansion and dilation, Abhinavagupta remarks that even granting for argument's sake that it is so, it is not simply that much, but something more (अथोच्यते अतितिरिति रसस्य भोगीकरणम्, तच्य द्रुत्यादि स्वरूपमस्तु । तथापि न तावन्मात्रम् ।). This is so because the apprehensions of *Rasas*, consisting of their delectability or enjoyability, are at least as many as the *Rasas* or the emotions themselves. And so far as the three states of mind, i.e., fluidity, expansion and dilation corresponding to the three *guṇas*, viz., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are concerned, Abhinavagupta points out that they are almost endless, depending upon their position of importance or subordination, and in that case, why should we restrict the number of the states of mind to three only? (यावन्तो हि रसास्तावत्य एव रसनात्मिका: अतीतयो भोगीकरणस्वभावा, गुणानां चांगागिवैचिभ्यमनन्त कष्व्यमिति का त्रित्वेनेयत्ता ।).

Lastly, Abhinavagupta tries to show that the process of *bhāvanā* which is posited by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, only amounts to *vyañjanā* or suggestion, which even includes the process of *bhoga* or delectation. Thus when Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka states that the Rasas like *śṛṅgāra* are made the objects of *bhāvanā* by poetry, Abhinavagupta is prepared to accept it, provided this *bhāvanā* means 'making the object of the apprehension, which possesses the nature of relish produced by the stimulants, consequents, etc'. This process is nothing but *vyañjanā* or *dhvani* itself, which leads to the generalization of the *vibhāvas*, etc. (भावनाभाव्य 'एषोऽपि श्रृंगारादिगणो हि यत्' इतियत्काव्येन भाव्यन्ते रसा इत्युच्यते तत्र विभावादिजनितचर्वणात्मकास्वादरूप अत्ययगोचरतापादनमेव यदि भावनं तदभ्युपगम्यत एव ।). However, Abhinavagupta makes it clear that in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's statement, that 'Rasa is the poetic content revealed by the process of *saṁvedana*

(knowledge), being the object of supreme consciousness and consisting of the experience of relish', the word '*vyaṅgya*' refers to the process of being suggested, that is to say, to *vyañjanā* only, and the word '*anubhava*' (experience) refers to the object of that suggestion (यतूक्तम्—

'संवेदनारव्यव्यंयस्तु परसंवित्तिगोचर: ।
आस्वादनात्मानुभवो रस: काव्यार्थ उच्यते ॥'

तत्र व्यज्यमानतया व्यंग्यो लक्ष्यते, अनुभवेन च तद्विषय इति मन्तव्यम् ।

There is no doubt that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, through his theory of *bhāvanā*, emphasized one of the most important factors of aesthetic appeal. The contents of poetry or drama, though dealing with personal experience or situation, must have a generalized or universalized aspect (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*), in order to be made worthy of the sympathetic apprehension and appreciation of an aesthete. The objective elements in individual experience, thought and feeling, must be objectified, impersonalized (or depersonalized), so that they are relished on a general plane. The dramatist of the poet must possess the capacity to approach the universal through the particular. Secondly, the term *bhāvana*, with its roots in Mīmāṁsā philosophy, also emphasized the quality of the poetic or dramatic content to be relishable (*rasanā*), as well as the necessity of the reader's or spectator's repeated meditation or contemplation over the poetic content (*carvaṇā*), which yields a renewed pleasure every time. It is a usual experience of every mature reader that the repeated reading of a classic brings every time a fresh delight. Abhinavagupta suggests that both these processes, of generalization of the dramatic (or poetic) content through the dramatist's skilful representation, and of the relishability or delectability of the emotion are achieved through *vyañjanā* or suggestion only, and hence it is not necessary to assume two separate processes, to wit, *bhavanā* and *bhoga*, as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka has done. However, the very fact that Abhinavagupta endeavours to include these processes under *vyañjanā*

or *dhvani*, is itself a concrete proof that he could not afford to ignore them completely, as he had done in the case of Śaṅkuka's theory of inference. Further, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's contention that the apprehension of *Rasa* is an extraordinary process, quite distinct from the normal processes of apprehension, and also that this apprehension reaches an ecstatic or transcendental level, is admitted by Abhinavagupta in a rather modified form in the course of his own exposition of *Rasa*.

ABHINAVAGUPTA

After clearly expounding in this manner the views of earlier commentators on *Rasa*, Abhinavagupta sets out in exhaustive details his own theory of *Rasa*. At the outset, he declares that his object in giving a new interpretation in the matter is not a mechanical repetition of what is obvious (नन्वेवं कथं रसतत्त्वमास्तताम् । किं कुर्मः । आम्नायसिद्धे किमपूर्वमेतत्संविद्विकासेऽधिगतागमित्वम् । इत्थं स्वयंग्राहमहार्हहेंतुद्वन्द्वेनकि दूषयिता न लोकः ।।). In fact, he gives full credit to the pioneering work of earlier scholars who have prepared a kind of staircase on which the fresh intellect can climb high up, and then, untiringly, view the truth or essence of things (त्ऊध्वोंर्ध्वमारुह्य यदर्थतत्त्वं धीःपश्यतिश्रान्तिमवेदयन्ती । फलं तदाद्यै परिकारपितानां विवेक-सोपानपरम्पराणाम् ।।). The first enumeration of a dectrine is like a picture without a prop. But once the correct route has been found, even the construction of bridges or founding of cities is not surprising (चित्रं निरालम्वनमेव मन्ये अमेयसिद्धो अथमावतारम् । तन्मार्गलाभे सति सेतुबन्धपुरअतिष्ठादि न विस्मयाय ।।). Hence what Abhinavagupta now does is improving upon the views of earlier scholars, and not demolishing or carping at them. People say that the reinforcement of the original doctrine follows upon the proper synthesis of earlier views (तस्मात्सतामत्र स दूषितानि मतानि तान्येव तू शोधितानि । पूर्वंअतिष्ठापितयोजनासु मूलअतिष्ठाफलमामनन्ति ।।). Thus, Abhinavagupta is inspired by the urge to reach the maximum perfection in understanding the implications of Bharata's doctrine, and not by a desire to obliterate or obscure the works of earlier commentators. It will be clear

in the course of his exposition that he has made a very judicious use of whatever grains of truth he found in the earlier views.

In fact, the final truth in the matter of *Rasa* has been enunciated by Bharata himself in the Seventh Adhyāya, while defining the *bhāvas*, and Abhinavagupta is not expounding anything brand new. There Bharata says that the bhāvas make the poetic contents or meaning a matter of apprehension, or contemplation. Now Abhinavagupta comments that this poetic content itself is *Rasa*, after it has been contemplated by the reader or spectator (तहृयुंच्यतां परिशुद्धतत्त्वम् । उक्तमेव मुनिना न त्वपूर्णं किंचित् । तथा ह्याह 'काव्याथनि भावयन्ति' इति । तत्काव्यार्थो रस: ।).

To illustrate how the poetic matter or content becomes an object of the delightful contemplation of the reader or spectator, Abhinavagupta gives an analogy from the science of ritual. The performer of a sacrifice, eligible for, and intent upon, it, hears statements pertaining to earlier sacrifices, as 'the gods performed a sacrificial session', 'Prajāpati offered the marrow into fire', etc. Now this simple apprehension on his part, which arises in the beginning and which interests him, is soon transformed into an additional apprehension, i.e., a desire such as 'I shall myself perform a sacrifice', 'I shall offer an oblation', etc. In the case of this additional apprehension the idea of the past tense is completely discarded, and the apprehension is known by various names, such as poetic inspiration (*pratibhā*), intent desire (*bhāvanā*), injunction (*vidhi*) and activity (*udyoga*), depending on the various provinces of knowledge. Similar is the additional apprehension arising in the case of a competent or qualified reader from words in a poem (यथा हि 'सत्रमासत', 'तामग्नौ आदात्' । इत्यादावर्थितादिलक्षितस्याधिकारिण: अतिपात्तेमाभादितिवृत्तअरोचितात् । अथमअवृत्तादनन्तरमधिकैवोपात्तकालतिरस्कारेण 'आसै', 'अददानि' इत्यादिरूपा संक्रमणादिस्वभावा यथादर्शनं अतिभाभावनाविध्युद्योगादिभाषाभिर्व्यवहृताअतिपत्ति:, तथैव काव्यात्मकादपि शब्दादधिकारिणोऽधिकास्ति अतिपत्ति: ।).

This competent or qualified reader (*adhikārin*) is defined by Abhinavagupta as one whose heart is illumined by the flash of bright and pure inspiration. When he reads a fine verse like '*Grīrābhaṅgābhirāmaṁ...*', etc., in the drama *Abhijñāna-śakunkalaṁ* (I.7), vividly describing the fright of the running deer being chased by Dusyanta; or like '*Umāpi nīlālaka-madhyaśobhi...*', etc., or like '*Harastu kiṁcit pariluptadhair-yaḥ...*', etc., in the poetic work *Kumārasambhavaṁ* (III. 62, 67) depicting Pārvatī's nervous salutation to Śiva and Śiva's consequent loss of equanimity, he initially apprehends the meaning of the words of the stanza. Then there arises in him an apprehension of the nature of mental visualization, completely divorced from the distinctions of time, space, etc., entailed by that particular sentence, etc. In that apprehension the young deer (like similar other entities) that figures has absolutely no special form, and even the idea of being 'frightened' has no real source of terror. Thus, what causes the 'emotion of fearful' is fear only, but untained by space, time, etc. Hence, it is distinct from normal apprehensions like 'I am afraid', 'he is afraid', 'he is an enemy', 'he is a friend', or 'he is neutral', so on and so forth—apprehensions which are beset with obstacles because of the inevitable occurrence of other ideas like abandoning, receiving, etc., caused by sorrow, unhappiness and the like. This fear is apprehended without any obstruction, as if it directly enters the heart, or as if it moves before our very eyes. In such a kind of fear the self of the reader is neither totally oblitera-ted, nor particularly involved. The same thing is true of others also. Hence, the generalization of the apprehension is not limited, but extended or widened, just like the knowledge of the concomitance of smoke and fire, or of fear and tremor (अधिकारी चात्र विमलअतिभानशालिहृदय: । तस्य च 'ग्रीवामंगाभिरामम्' इति, 'उमापि नीलालक' इति, 'हरस्तु किंचित्' इत्यादिवाक्येभ्यो वाक्यार्थअतीतेरनन्तरं मांनसी साक्षात्कारात्मिकाअयहस्तिततद्वाक्योपात्तकालादिविभागा अतीतिरुपजायते । तस्यां च यो मृगपोतकादि र्भाति तस्य विशेषरूपत्वाभावाद् भीत इति त्रासकस्यापारमार्थिकत्वाद् भयमेव परं देशकालाधनालिंगितम्, तत् एव 'भीतोऽहम्, भीतोऽयम्, शत्रुर्वयस्यो मध्यस्थो वा' इत्यादिअत्ययेभ्यो दु:खसुखादिकृतहानादिबुद्धन्तरोदयनियमवत्तया विघ्नबहुलेभ्यो विलक्षणं निर्विघ्नअतीतिग्राह्यं

साक्षादिव हृदये निविशमावं चक्षुषोरिव विपरिवर्तमानं भयानको रस। तथाविधे हि भये नात्मात्यन्तं तिरस्कृतो न विशेषत उल्लिखित। एवं परोऽपि। ततो न परिमितमेव साधारण्यम, अपि तु बिततम्, व्याप्तिग्रह इव धूमाग्न्यो: भेयकम्पयोरेव वा।).

This vivid realization of *Rasa* is nourished or reinforced by the dramatic accessories like actors, their speeches, costumes, etc. By virtue of these accessories, the restricting conditions like space, time, the knower, etc., in the real world as well as in poetry, cancel each other and totally disappear, paving the way for the generalization or universalization of the emotion which considerably increases. Hence, it is that the homogeneity of the apprehension of all spectators leads to the highest nourishment or heightening of the emotion, all of them possessing minds coloured or variegated by beginningless subliminal impressions, and hence their harmony. This apprehension of *Rasa*, free from all obstructions, is itself the relish or delectation, the *camatkāra*. Even the physical manifestation of that relish, such as tremor, homipilation, the swelling of the body, etc., is styled as *camatkāra*. The analogy of this thrilling delectation that Abhinavagupta gives is that of the great surprise of Lord Viṣṇu's mind that the tender limbs of Lakṣmī, resembling the delicate digits of the orb of the moon, were nor pounded by Mount Mandara in the process of churning the ocean—something which causes a thrill not only at the moment of actual experience, but even in its contemplation (तदत्र साक्षात्कारायमाणत्वे परिपोषिका नटादिसामग्री यस्यां वस्तुसतां काव्यर्पितानां च देशकालअमात्रदीनां नियमहेतूनामन्योन्यअतिबन्धबलादत्यन्त-मपसरणे स एव साधारणीभाव:। सुतरां पुण्यन्ति। अत एव सर्वसामाजिकानामेकघनतैव अतिपत्ते: सुतरां परिपोषाय, सर्वेषामनादिवासनाचित्रीकृतचेतसां वासनासंवादात्। सा चाविघ्ना संविच्चमत्कार:। तज्जोऽपि कम्पपुलकोल्लुकसनादिर्विकारश्चमत्कार:। यथा—
अज्ज वि हरी चयक्कइ कहगह वि ण मंदरेण दलिआइं।
चंदकलाकंदलसच्छहाइं लच्छोए अंगाइं।।)

This delectation, this *camatkāra*, is further described by Abhinavagupta as an uninterrupted, ceaseless enjoyment, bereft of all feeling of insatiety. He explains the term *camatkāra* itself as the process which posits an enjoyer—an

apprehender who is infused with the throbbing, the pulsating of a mysterious, marvellous kind of enjoyment. If a further explanation is necessary, it may be described as having the nature of a mental apprehension resembling vivid realization of the self, or contemplation, or memory not operating in its usual form, viz., requiring a prior experience. The famous verse in the *Abhijñānaśakuntalaṁ* (V. 2) brings out the nature of this memory as that of even a happily situated being who becomes restless on seeing beautiful objects and hearing sweet sounds, and remembers, mentally and in an unconscious manner, the friendships of other (i,e., previous) existences, embedded in the form of feelings. This apprehension of emotion is wholly of the nature of relish, wherein we have joy or delight, pure and simple. Hence it is enjoyable, being untainted by any particularities (of place, time, etc.). It is neither an ordinary worldly apprehension, nor a false one, nor indefinable, nor resembling a worldly apprehension, nor anything superimposed upon that, in other words, quite unique. If at all, it has to be aligned with the perceptions of other schools, Abhinavagupta concedes that it may be said to be of the nature of intensification as Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa says, but without the constraints of place, time, etc. It may even be said to be of the nature of imitation, as Śaṅkuka considers it inasmuch as it follows in the wake of the *bhāvas*. It may even be stated to be phenomenal as the Saṁkhyaites believe, provided we have recourse to the idealist theory. On the whole, *Rasa* or aesthetic emotion is nothing but the *bhāva* itself, consisting entirely of relish or delectation, and is the object of an apprehension totally free from obstructions (तथा हि, स चातृप्तिव्यतिरेकेणाच्छिन्नो भोगावेश इत्युच्यते । भुञ्जानस्याद्भुतभोगस्पन्दाविष्टस्य चमत: करणं कमत्कार इति । स च साक्षात्कारस्वभावो मानसाध्यवसायो वा संकल्पौ वा स्मृतिवी तथात्वेनास्फुरन्तस्त् यदाह—

रम्याणि वीक्ष्य मधुरांश्च निशम्य शब्दान्
पर्युत्सुकीभवति यत्सुखितोऽपि जन्तु: ।
तच्चेतसा स्मरति नूनमबोधपूर्वं
भावस्थिराणि जननान्तरसौहृदानि ।। इत्यादि ।।

सर्वथा तावंदथस्ति अतीति रास्वादात्मा यस्यां रविरेव भाति । त.त एव विशेषान्तरानु-पहितत्वात्सा रसनीया सती न लौकिकी न मिथ्या नानिर्वाच्या न लौकिकतुष्या न तदारोपादि रूपा । तथैव चोपचयावस्थाऽस्तु देशाधनियन्त्रणात्, अनुकारोऽप्यस्तु भावानुगामितया कारणात् । त्रिषरसामग्रयपि भवतु विज्ञानवादावलम्बनात् । सर्वथा रसनात्मकवीतविघ्न-अतीतिग्राह्यो भाव एव रस: ।)

The above elucidation of the apprehension of emotional experience given by Abhinavagupta highlights some of the most perceptive of his insights into the nature of *Rasa*. At the outset he points out how a poetic or dramatic content completely envelops the mind of the appreciative reader or spectator, and becomes an object of his deep contemplation. This apprehension is soon stripped of its pecular conditions of space and time, and takes on the form of a general, universal apprehension. When such an appreciative reader or spectator comes across a good piece of emotional delineation, the emotion itself, freed from its limiting adjuncts, takes possession of him. He relishes it purely in his own self. The dramatic accessories as well as the poetic descriptions help him in this matter, by removing the obstacles embodied by the particularity of time and space, and by presenting the emotion in a generalized form. Since the minds of all spectators possess a uniform residue of subliminal impressions, all of them are capable of experiencing a harmonious apprehension, and this harmonious, homogeneous apprehension, itself is *camatkāra*—delectation and ceaseless enjoyment. It is a unique kind of experience, quite unlike any worldly experience or apprehension that we can imagine.

SEVEN-FOLD PSYCHIC OBSTACLES

Having thus explained his own thesis regarding the exact nature and apprehension of *Rasa*, Abhinavagupta states that the *vibhāvas* and other accessories in drama are instrumental in removing the obstacles in the apprehension of *Rasa*, and that the spectator's consciousness itself, freed from all

shackles, is designated in the world by various names, such as *camatkāra*, *nirveśa*, *rasanā*, *āsvādana*, *bhoga*, *samāpatti*, *laya*, *viśrānti*, etc., all of which are just mutual synonyms (तत्र विघ्नापसारका विभावप्रभृतयः। तथा हि लोके सकलविघ्नविनिर्मुक्ता संवित्तिरेव चमत्कारनिर्वेशरसनास्वादनभोगसमापत्तिलयविश्रान्त्यादिशब्दैरभिधीयते ।). The obstacles to this consciousness are seven-fold, viz., the incapacity for apprehension termed as the absence of imagination; attachment to, or overabsorption in, a particular place and time as belonging to oneself or to another person; the state of being affected by one's personal happiness, etc.; the fallibility of the means of apprehension; their absence of clarity or distinctness; the absence of prominence of the *sthāyin;* and the rise of a doubt (विघ्नाश्चास्यां प्रतिपत्तावयोग्यता संभावनाविरहो नाम, स्वगतत्वपरगतत्वनियमेन देशकालविशेषावेशः निजसुखादिविवशीभावः प्रतीत्युपायवैकल्यम्, स्फुटत्वाभाव, अप्रधानता, संशययोगश्च ।).

Abhinavagupta explains the nature of these obstacles in details. Thus he states that the first obstacle, viz., the spectator's incapacity for apprehension or absence of imagination consists in this that the spectator who cannot imagine the object of apprehension or consciousness is not able even to sustain his consciousness in the object of apprehension; then how can his consciousness experience repose there? The idea here seems to refer to the delineation of emotions, feelings, etc., which are beyond the scope of the average reader's imagination or sensibility. For removing this obstacle, Abhinavagupta suggests two remedies. One remedy is that the spectator should try to attune or harmonize his own heart to the ordinary things of the world, that is to say, he should widen the horizon of his observation and sensibility, which would give him a broader perspective of things and greater sympathy. The other remedy rests with the dramatist. While describing extraordinary accomplishments, he should have recourse to famous names like that of Rāma, etc., which would help the people's belief in them, born as a result of their uninterrupted fame that lies deeply imbedded in people's minds. Hence it is that in plays whose purpose

is the tendering of advice regarding extraordinary excellence and also wisdom, a well-known theme and the like will be prescribed as a rule; this is not so in a farce or any other sort of burlesque. Abhinavagupta states that he will enlarge upon this idea in the proper place, viz., in the course of the discussion of the ten forms of drama in Adhyāya XVIII of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, entitled '*Daśarūpanirūpaṇa*' (तथा हि संवेघमसंभावयमान: संवेधे संविदं निवेशयितुमेव न शक्नोक्ति का तत्र विश्रान्तिरिति प्रथमो विघ्न: । तदपसारणे हृदयसंवादो लोकसामान्यवस्तुविषय: । अलोकसामान्येषु तु चेष्टितेषु अखण्डप्रसिद्धिजनितगाढारुढप्रत्ययप्रसरकारी प्रख्यातरामादिनामधेय परिग्रह: । अतएव नि:सामान्योत्कर्षोपदेशव्युत्पत्तिप्रयोजने नाटकादौ प्रख्यातवस्तुविषयत्वादि नियमेन निरुपयिष्यते न तु प्रहसनादौ । तच्च स्वावसर एव वक्ष्याम इत्यास्तां तावत् ।).

The second obstacle to the apprehension of *Rasa* that Abhinavagupta mentions is the absence of what is known as the proper aesthetic or psychic distance between the dramatic situation and the spectator (for the concept of aesthetic distance see *Encyclopaedia of Poetry and Poetics*, ed. Alex Preminger, Princeton, **1972**, *pp*. 5-6). The obstacle may arise from the fact that the spectator identifies the various dramatic feelings with himself and relishes them accordingly, or with some other person. In both cases the result is equally undesirable. If he relishes the feelings only as referring to himself, they will give rise to a very great hindrance in the apprehension of *Rasa*, by producing other kinds of reflex or corresponding feelings, because of the spectator's fear of their disappearance, or of his concern for their protection (or preservation), or his desire for acquiring something resembling them, or desire for avoiding them, or for making them known to others, or for concealing them, or in any other manner possible. Even if he experiences the dramatic feelings as referring necessarily to another person, the obstacle is inevitable, as they are likely to give rise to other corresponding feelings in his own heart, such as happiness, sorrow, delusion, indifference, etc. (स्वैकगतानां च सुखदु:खसंविदामास्वादे यथासंभवं तदपगमभीरुतया वा तत्परिरक्षाव्यग्रतया वा तत्सदृशार्जिजीषया वा, ताज्जिहासया वा तत्प्राचिख्यापयिषया वा तद्गोपनेच्छया वा प्रकारान्तरेण वा संवेदनान्तर-

समुद्गम एव परमो विघ्नः। परगतत्वनियमभाजामपि सुखदुःखानां संवेदने नियमेन स्वात्मनि सुखदुःखमोहमध्यस्थ्यादिसंविदन्तरोद्गमनसंभावनादवश्यंभावी विघ्नः।).

Bharata's solution to this problem of maintaining aesthetic distance is, Abhinavagupta states, the disguising or camouflaging the actor's personality with devices like the head-dress etc. For this purpose he has already established the actor's personality as actor, different from that as an individual, by not allowing the dramatic preliminaries to be covered up, with the advice that there should not be too much of dance and song (Adhyāya V of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*), and by its being observed in the *Prastāvanā* or Exposition. The device is accompanied by dramatic conventions like the extraordinary or unusual variety of language, etc., the various divisions of *lāsya* or delicate dance, the stage, the divisions of the auditorium, etc. With this device there is no apprehension that the happiness or sorrow is of this particular actor, or of this particular time or place, since the original personality of the actor as actor is concealed, as the other character superimposed upon him as a particular character, does not find its repose in itself, as a result of defective rest in the spectator's consciousness, and ultimately only ends in concealing his real personality as an actor. To elucidate : the varieties of *lāsya*, like *āsīnapāṭhya*, *puṣpagandhikā*, etc., are not usually seen in the world, nor are they totally absent since their possibility always exists. All this subject has been undertaken by Bharata, as it subserves the purpose of relish of *Rasa* through generalization, and will be clarified at its proper place, dispensing with its treatment at this moment. This finishes the explanation of the way of removing the obstacle in *Rasa*, when the consciousness is confined to oneself or to another person (तदपाकरणे 'कार्यो नातिप्रसंगा' इत्यादिना पूर्वरंगनिगूहनेन प्रस्तावनावलोकनेन च यो नटरूपताधिगमस्तत्पुरः सर प्रतिशीर्षकादिना तत्प्रच्छादनप्रकारोऽभ्युपायः अलौकिकभाषादिभेदलास्यांगपीठमण्डपगत-कक्ष्यादिपरिग्रहनाट्यधर्मिसहितः। तस्मिन हि अस्यैव अत्रैव एतर्ह्येव च सुखं दुःखं वेति न भवति प्रतीतिः, स्वरूपस्य निह्नवात्, रूपान्तरस्य चारोपितस्य प्रतिभासंविद्विश्रान्तिवैकल्येन स्वरूपे विश्रान्त्यभावात् सत्यतदीयरूपनिह्नवमात्र एव पर्यवसानात्। तथा हि आसीन-

पाठ्यपुष्पगन्धिकादि लोके न दृष्टम् । न च तन्न किंचित् कथंचित्संभाव्यत्वात् । इतिं स एष सर्वो मुनिना साधारणीभावसिद्धया रसचर्वणोपयोगित्वेन परिकरबन्धः समाश्रित इति तत्रैव स्फुटीभविष्यतीतिं तदिह तावन्नोंन्नमनीयम् । ततः स एष स्वपरनियताविघ्नापसारण-प्रकारो व्याख्यातः ।).

The third obstacle in the matter of the relish of *Rasa* refers to the spectator's overabsorption with his own personal feelings like happiness, sorrow etc. Though such a spectator enters the theatre for a social entertainment, he is so much lost in his private world that he cannot come out of it. The consequence is that he is not able to place his consciousness in another matter, which, in this case, is the object of representation where it should find repose, and hance is not able to relish the *Rasa*. Abhinavagupta states that with a view to removing this obstacle, various means of entertainment are employed, such as musical instruments, songs, various kinds of circular movements, accomplished courtesans, etc., — things which refer to particular objects or persons, but are capable of being enjoyed by all by virtue of generalisation, consisting of sense-objects like sound, etc. Because of these means, even a person lacking aesthetis sensibility is turned into an aesthete, as he obtains clarity (or purity) of heart. Hence, it has been said in *Nātyśāstra*, Adhyāya I, that the nature of the entertainment, requested of Lord Brahman by the sages, should be both visible and audible (निजसुखादिविवशीभूतश्च कथं वस्त्वन्तरे संविदं विश्रामयेदिति तत्प्रत्यूह-व्यपोहनाथ प्रतिपदार्थनिष्ठैः साधारण्यमहिम्ना सकलभोग्यत्वसहिष्णुभिः शब्दादिविषयमयैरातोद्यगानविचित्रमण्डलपदविदग्धगणिकादिभिरुपरञ्जनं समाश्रितं येनाहृदयोऽपि हृदयवैमल्यप्राह्या सहृदयीक्रियते । उक्तं हि 'दृश्यं श्रव्यं च' इति ।).

The fourth and fifth obstacles in the apprehension of *Rasa*, viz., defect in the means of apprehension and the absence of clarity respectively, are discussed by Abhinavagupta simultaneously, since their nature is more or less the same. He urges that in the absence of the proper means of apprehension, the apprehension cannot certainly take place. Nor can it find a full repose inspite of the presence of verbal

testimony and inference, if they cause indistinct apprehension, since repose demands an apprehension which is in conformity with direct or visual perception of the nature of clear apprehension. As it has been said, 'All this knowledge depends on perception,' since what has been directly seen by oneself leads to the knowledge of that thing only and of nothing else, in spite of hundreds of scriptural proofs and inferences. In the case of a fire-brand the dismissal of its wrong knowledge takes place only through another and a powerful (or compelling) knowledge. This is the order of the world even in case of an illusion. Hence, for the purpose of removing both these obstacles, gesticulation, reinforced by worldly conventions, modes of behaviour and propensities, is made conspicuous. Abhinavagupta also promises to prove later on conclusively that gesticulation is quite distinct from the process of verbal testimony and inference, and is at par with the process of direct perception. In other words, it creates a vivid impression on the minds of the audience which only a real event can, and it guarantees the apprehension of *Rasa* (किंच अतीत्युपायानामभावे कथं प्रतीतिः । अस्फुटप्रतीतिकारिशब्दालिंगसंभवेऽपि न प्रतीतिर्विश्राम्यति, स्फुटप्रतीतिरूपप्रत्यक्षोचितप्रत्ययसाकाङ्क्षत्वात् । यथाहुः 'सर्वा चेयं अमितिः प्रत्यक्षपरा' इति । स्वसाक्षात्कृते आगमानुमानशतैरपि अनन्यथाभावस्य स्वसंवेदनात् । अलातचक्रादौ साक्षात्कारान्तरेणैव बलवता तत्प्रमित्यपसारणादिति लौकिकस्तावदयं क्रमः । तस्मात्तदुभयविघ्नविघातेऽभिनया लोकधर्मिवृत्तिप्रवृत्त्युपस्कृताः समभिषेच्यन्ते । अभिनयनं हि शब्दलिंगव्यापारविसदृशमेव प्रत्यक्षव्यापारकल्पमिति निश्चेष्यामः ।).

The sixth obstacle in the apprehension of *Rasa* is the absence of prominence given to the *sthāyin*, in a play. A playwright must make a judicious discrimination between the *sthāyin*, on the one hand, and the set of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicārins*, on the other, and should not commit the fatal blunder of making the latter prominent in any way. Abhinavagupta explains this point by asking a pertinent question : 'Whose consciousness can find repose in an insignificant matter ?'—since the apprehension of this matter will itself run to another which is really conspicuous and thus will not find repose in itself. Thus, the absence of prominence is

quite possible in the case of the group of the *vibhāvas* and the *anubhāvas* which are insentient, and also in the case of the cluster of *vyabhicārins* which, as a rule, turn to another, viz., the *sthāyin*, in spite of their possessing the nature of consciousness, and hence the *sthāyin* itself, distinct from them, is the abode of relish. Among these *sthāyins* again, some states are more prominent, as they are based on the goals of human existence. Thus the *sthāyin* of love is based on passion and religious conduct and wealth following in its wake; the *sthāyin* of anger is based on wealth (or material acquisition), though terminating in passion and religious conduct; the *sthāyin* of enthusiasm or energy terminates in all the four goals like religious conduct; while the *sthāyin* of self-restraint, consistiug mainly of dejection born of the knowledge of truth, is a means to salvation. Hence their prominence. Though these have the position of subordination with reference to one another, each one of them is prominent in the variety of drama based on it as important, and thus the prominence of all of them is noticed in the matter of the varieties of drama. Even if we restrict our view to a narrow range, in the same variety of drama the prominence of the *sthāyin* keeps varying.

Abhinavagupta further observes that all of these *sthāyins* are of the nature of happiness or joy, since the light which is of the nature of the relish of one's own consciousness, and quite homogeneous, has joy or delight as its essence. Thus, it is found in the world that the hearts of women-folk (known for their tenderness and sensitivity) find repose even in the relish of their consciousness which consists of sorrow pure and simple, because the nature of that relish is repose itself, free from any obstacles. What constitutes sorrow is the absence of repose itself. For this reason only, the followers of Kapila, the founder of Sāṁkhya philosophy, have proclaimed evanescence as the very soul of sorrow by declaring that sorrow is the quality of *rajas* (delusion). Thus it stands to reason that all the aesthetic emotions or *Rasas*

are of the nature of joy. However, some of them are occasionally tinged with bitterness, with regard to the objects of diverson as in the case of the heroic emotion. That emotion has as its very life or essence the endurance of torment, etc. This is the nature of the prominence of *sthāyins* like love, anger, enthusiasm and self-restraint. However no prominence has been attached to *sthāyins*, such as, laughter, grief, fear, disgust and wonder, as they have abundant scope as means of diversion, possessing the stimuli easily available to the whole world. Hence, it is that *sthāyins* like laughter are mostly found in the case of men of low character. All lowly persons laugh, lament, fear, indulge in ridiculing others, and feel surprises even at a wise utterance of little consequence. Of course, they may be useful as serving the goals of human existence, by being subordinate to *sthāyins* like love. Abhinavagupta promises that he will himself later on explain the varieties of ten kinds of plays (cited in *Nāṭya-śāstra*, Adhyāya XVIII), based on the relative subordination and prominence of these *sthāyins* (अप्रधाने च वस्तुनि कस्य संविद्विश्राम्यति तस्यैव प्रत्ययस्य प्रधानान्तंर प्रत्यनुधावत: स्वात्मन्यविश्रान्तत्वात् । अतोऽप्रधानत्वं जडे विभावानुभाववर्गे व्यभिचारिनिचये च संविदात्मकेऽपि नियमेनान्यमुखप्रेक्षिणि संभवतीति तदतिरिक्त: स्थाय्येव तथा चर्वणापात्रम् । तत्र पुरुषार्थनिष्ठा: काश्चित्संविद इति प्रधानम् । तद्यथारति: कामतदनुषगिंधमर्थिनिष्ठा, क्रोधस्तत्प्रधनिष्वर्थनिष्ठ: कामधर्मपर्यवसितोऽपि, उत्साह: समस्तधर्मादिपर्यवसित:, तत्त्वज्ञानजनितनिर्वेदप्राय: शमश्च मोक्षोपाय इति तावदेषां प्राधान्यम् । यद्यपि चैषामप्यन्योन्यं गुणभावोऽस्ति तथापि तत्तत्प्रधाने रूपके तत्तत् प्रधानं भवतीति रूपकभेदपर्यायेण सर्वेषां प्राधान्यमेषां लक्ष्यते । अदूरभागाभिनिविष्टदृशा तु एकस्मिन्नपि रूपके पृथक्प्राधान्यम् । तत्र सर्वेऽमी सुखप्रधाना: स्वसंविच्चर्वणरूपस्यैकघनस्य प्रकाशस्यानन्दसारत्वात् । तथा हि एकघनशोकसंविच्चर्वणेऽपि लोके स्त्रीलोकस्य हृदयविश्रान्ति: अन्तरायशून्यविश्रान्तिशरीरत्वात् । अविश्रान्तिरूपतैव दु:खम् । तत एव कापिलैर्दु:खस्य चाञ्चलयमेव प्राणत्वेनोक्तं रजोवृत्तितां वदद्भिरित्यानन्दरूपता सर्वरसानाम् । किंतूपरञ्जकविषयवशात्केषामपि कटुकिम्नास्ति स्पर्शो वीरस्येव । स हि क्लेशसहिष्णुतादिप्राण एव । एवं इत्यादीनां प्राधान्यम् । हासादीनां तु सातिशयं सकललोकसुलभविभावतयोपरञ्जकत्वमिति न प्राधान्यम् । अत एवानुत्तमप्रकृतिषु बाहुतयेन हासादयो भवन्ति । पामरप्राय: सर्वोऽपि हसति शोचति बिभेति परनिन्दामाद्रियते अल्पसुभाषितत्वेन च सर्वत्र विस्मयते । रत्याद्यङ्गतया तु पुमर्थोपयोगित्वमपि स्यादेषाम् । एतद्गुणप्रधानभावकृत एव च दशरूपकादिभेद इति वक्ष्याम: ।).

In Abhinavagupta's opinion, these are the only *sthāyins*, properly so called, since the moment a being is born, he is surrounded by these many states of consciousness. Thus, in keeping with the maxim, 'each being hates contact with sorrow and is intent on the relish of happiness', each being is pervaded by the desire to enjoy love; laughs at others by arrogating excellence to himself; is tormented by separation from desired objects, falls a victim to anger towards the causes of that separation or is frightened of them in the event of his incapacity to fight them out; though desiring to conquer objects, he is overcome by indifference towards the objects conquered, regarding some of the things as not desirable; and he is full of surprise at the sight of various duties and desires to abandon something. There is no being devoid of the impressions of these mental states. Only somebody has some particular mental state in excess, and some other state or states to a lesser degree; somebody's mental state is controlled by proper objects, while some other's is otherwise. Thus, only some particular mental state is conducive to a goal of human existence, and hence commendable. It is the distinction between these states that leads to the usage of men possessing noble nature and so on (स्थायित्वं चैंतावतामेव । जात एव हि जन्तुरियतीभि: संविद्भि: परीतो भवति । तथा हि 'दू:खसंश्लेषविद्वेषी सुखास्वादनतत्पर:' इति न्यायेन सर्वो किरंसया व्याप्त: स्वात्मत्युत्कर्षमानितया परमुपहसन अभीष्टवियोगसंतप्तस्तधेतुषु कोपपरवशोऽशक्तौ च ततो भीरु: किंचिज्जिगीषुरपि जितवस्तुविषयवैमुख्यात्मतयाझान्त: किंचिदनभीष्टतयाभिमन्यमानस्तत्तत्स्वकर्तव्यदर्शनसमुदितविस्मय: किंचिच्च जिहासुखे जायते । न ह्येतच्चित्तवृत्तिवासनाशून्य: प्राणी भवति । केवलं कस्यांचित्काचिदधिका चित्तवृत्ति: काचिदूना, कस्यचिदुचितविषयनियन्त्रिता कस्यचिदन्यथा । तत्काचिदेव पुमर्थोपयोगिनीत्युपदेश्या । तद्विभागकृतश्चोत्तमप्रकृत्यादिव्यवहार: ।).

Abhinavagupta now explains why the *vyabhicārins* do not deserve prominence as the *sthāyins* do. Peculiar mental states, he states, like *glāni* (weakness), *śaṅkā* (alarm, apprehension), etc., do not occur even in the whole life, in the absence of their proper *vibhāvas* or stimuli. Thus, in the case of a person consuming an invigorating drink, *glāni*

ālasya (sloth), *śrama* (fatigue), etc., do not arise. Even if they do occur in somebody's case on the strength of the stimuli, they are weakened on the loss or disappearance of the cause, and certainly do not constitute a continuum of mental impressions. However, *sthāyins* like *utsāha* (enthusiasm, energy), though they become almost non-existent or weak by reason of fulfilling their target, do not cross the stage of remaining behind in the form of mental impressions, since the moods like enthusiasm, etc., which have some other target or deed as their object, remains uninterrupted or constant. This can, as Patanjali observes, be described thus : 'When Caitra is enamoured of one woman, it is not that he is completely disinterested in others', and so on. Hence it is, Abhinavagupta says, that the *vyabhicārins* get that particular designation. In a very elaborate metaphor, he points out how they are interwoven in the thread of mental states which are of the nature of *sthāyins*. They partake of millions of variegated forms of rise and disappearance. They are like beads made of crystal, glass, mica, ruby, emerald, blue sapphire, etc., woven in threads which are red, blue etc., in colour and capable of thousands of varieties because of their being thinly woven. Like these beads they do not lend their own variegated impressions to the thread of the *sthāyin*, but on the contrary, possess the blend of the help of the thread. They themselves possess a variegated nature, and lend variety to the thread of the *sthāyin*. Off and on, they allow the thread of *sthāyin*, though pure, to shine and at the same time, constitute the blending of the various shades of jewels in the form of earlier and later *vyabhicārins*, also themselves glittering.

To illustrate how the *vyabhicārins* have only an evanescent and never a lasting existence, Abhinavagupta states that when there is a statement, 'He is weak (or exhausted)', the very question 'Owing to what?' leading to a cause, suggests the evanescent nature of the *vyabhicārin—glāni*. However, nobody asks such a question about the cause in the statement,

'Rāma is endowed with the power of enthusiasm'. Hence, only the *vibhāvas*, pointing to the *sthāyin*, lend it veriety because of their own nature, and only bring out the propriety or impropriety of *sthāyins* like *rati*, *utsāha*, etc. However, the *sthāyins* do not totally cease to exist in the absence of the *vyabhicārins*, since it has already been said that all beings are endowed with them in the form of subliminal impressions. The *vyabhicārins*, however, do not exist so much as in a name in the absence of the *sthāyins*. Abhinavagupta promises to illustrate this point still further in his commentary as the occasion demands. This is how, he sums up, sage Bharata has removed the obstacle of the lack of prominence given to the *sthāyin* with its elucidation—'We shall carry the *sthāyins* to the state of *Rasa*', based on a special definition of the *Rasa*, evolving out of its general definition (ये पुनरमी ग्लानिशंकाप्रभृतयाश्चित्तवृत्तिविशेषास्ते समुचितविभावाभावाज्जन्ममध्येऽपि न भवन्त्येव । तथा हि रसायनमुपयुक्तवतो ग्लान्यालस्यश्रमप्रभृतयो नोत्तिष्ठन्ति । यस्थापि भवन्ति विभावबलात्तस्यापि हेतुप्रक्षये क्षयिमाणाः संस्कारशेषतां नावश्यमनुबध्नन्ति । उत्साहादयस्तु संपादितस्वकर्तव्यतया प्रलनिकष्पा अपि संस्कारशेषतां नातिवर्तन्ते, कर्तव्यान्तरविषयस्योत्साहादेरखण्डनात् । यथाह पत्तञ्जलिः 'न हि चैत्र एकस्यां स्त्रियां रक्त इत्यन्यासु विरक्तः' इत्यादि । तस्मात्स्थायिरूपचित्तवृत्तिसूत्रस्यूता एवामी व्यभिचारिणः स्वात्मानमुदयास्तमयवैचित्र्यशतसहस्त्रधर्माणं प्रतिलभमाना रक्तनीलादिसूत्रस्यूतविरलभावोपलम्भनसंभावितभंगीसहस्त्रगर्भस्फटिककाचाभ्रकपद्मरागमरकतमहानीलादिमयगोलकवत्तस्मिन्सूत्रे स्वसंस्कारवैचित्र्यमनिवेशयन्तोऽपि तत्सूत्रकृतमुपकारसंदर्भं बिभ्रतः स्वयं च विचित्रार्थाः स्थायिसूत्रं च विचित्रयन्तोऽन्तरान्तरा शुद्धमपि स्थायिसूत्रं प्रतिभासावकाशमुपनयन्तोऽपि पूर्वापरव्यभिचारिरत्नच्छायाशबलिमानमवश्यमान्यन्तः प्रतिभासन्त इति व्यभिचारिण उच्यन्ते । तथा हि ग्लानोऽयमित्युक्ते कुत इति हेतुप्रश्नेनास्थायितास्य सूच्यते । न तु राम उत्साहशक्तिमानित्यत्र हेतुप्रश्नमाहुः । अत एव विभावास्तमोद्बोधकाः सन्तः स्वरूपोपरञ्जकत्वं विदधाना रत्युत्साहादेरुचितानुचितत्वमात्रमावहन्ति । न तु तदभावे सर्वथैव ते निरुपारव्याः, वासनात्मना सर्वजन्तूनां तन्मयत्वेनोक्तत्वात् । व्यभिचारिणां तु स्थायिभावाभावे नामापि नास्तीति । वितनिष्यते चैतद्यथायोगं व्याख्यावसरे । एवमप्रधानत्वनिरासः स्थायिनिरुपणया 'स्थायिभावान् रसत्वम्' इत्यनया सामान्यलक्षणशेषभूतया विशेषलक्षणनिष्ठया च मुनिना कृतः ।).

The seventh and the last obstacle in the apprehension of *Rasa* that Abhinavagupta mentions, is the rise of a doubt or uncertainty as to the exact nature of the *sthāyin* in an emotional situation. The *sthāyin* cannot be identified or

ascertained on the strength of the *anubhāvas*, *vibhāvas* and *vyabhicārins*, since they are not separately earmarked or restricted for any particular *sthāyin*. This is because we find *anubhāvas* like tears occasioned by joy as well as by an eye disease, vibhāvas like a tiger become the causes of anger, fear, etc., and *vyabhicārins* like fatigue, anxiety, etc., are seen to be the auxiliaries of many sthāyins like enthusiasm, fear, etc. However, their assemblage does not give rise to a doubt in the matter of the *sthāyin*. Thus, where we have a *vibhāva* like the loss of a relative, an *anubhāva* like lamentation, shedding of tears, etc., and *vyabhicārins* like anxiety (or concern), misery, etc., the *sthāyin* is certainly *śoka* (or grief). Thus, in the case of the rise of a doubt, the assembly of all the three factors has been laid down for the removal of the obstacle of the nature of a doubt (तत्रानुभावानां विभावानां व्यभिचारिणां च पृथक्स्थायिनि नियमो नास्ति, बाष्पादेरानन्दाक्षिरोगजत्वदर्शनात्, व्याघ्रादेश्च क्रोधभयादिहेतुत्वात्, श्रमचिन्तादेरुत्साहभयाद्यनेकसहचरत्वावलोकनात् । सामग्री तु न व्यभिचारिणी । तथा हि बन्धुविनाशो यत्र विभावः परिदेविताश्रुपातादिस्त्वनुभाव-श्चिन्तादैन्यादिर्व्यभिचारिणः सोऽवश्यं शोक एव । इत्येवं संशयोदये शंकात्मकविघ्नशमनाय संयोग उपात्तः ।).

It can be very easily seen that the thorough discussion of the seven obstacles and of the means of their removal proves beyond doubt Abhinavagupta's penetrating insight into all dramatic aspects leading to the realization of the *Rasa* on behalf of the spectator. Here he gives detailed instructions as to how each of the three human agencies involved in the process of *Rasa*—the dramatist, the actor and the spectator or *sāmājika*—should try to rise to the best of his skill and ability, how all their individual efforts should converge towards the apprehension of *Rasa*, the collective experience of human emotion in the theatre.

Abhinavagupta now brings out very clearly his own view of *Rasa* in this manner. Appreciative spectators of the drama do possess the necessary proficiency to infer the mental states of other people having abiding sentiments (*sthāyin*),

on the basis of their own observation, in daily life, of the inference of effects, causes and auxiliaries of things. Now the same subjects like gardens, glances, etc., which were ordinary causes, transcend the plane of empirical causality, when depicted on the stage and their sole essence consists in manifesting, corroborating and nourishing the *sthāyin*. Hence, it is that they are entitled as 'extraworldly' *vibhāvas*. Yet they are still designated as *vibhāvas* also, to convey their essential dependence on the mental impressions taking the form of earlier causes, effects, etc. Thus, they are *vibhāvas* with a distinction. Their exact nature and distinctions will be explained by Bharata in Adhyāya VII of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. In keeping with their greater or lesser prominence they enter into a proper relationship or unity or harmony with the minds of the spectators, and the object that they bring to a state of relish which is extraworldly in character, and partakes of the nature of consciousness devoid of all obstacles, that object is *Rasa* or aesthetic emotion. The essence of this object, *Rasa*, consists entirely in relish, though it has no accomplished nature. It has a temporary existence, and has no reference to a time other than that of relish, and it is totally distinct from the *sthāyin*.

Since in Abhinavagupta's opinion the *Rasa* is totally distinct from the *sthāyin*, he naturally does not agree with the view of Śaṅkuka and other scholars that the *sthāyin* itself is designated as *Rasa* because of its being relished, after it is made the object of apprehension by the *vibhāvas*, etc. If the *sthāyin* itself can become *Rasa*, why not accept *Rasa* even in the case of daily life ? If relish can take place in the case of the *vibhāvas*, etc., which do not really exist, why should it not occur in the case of things which do really exist? Thus the apprehension of the *sthāyin* which is obtained in the form of an inference, as Śaṅkuka explains it, is not *Rasa*. Hence, it is, Abhinavagupta states, that the word '*sthāyin*' has not been included in Bharata's aphorism of *Rasa*. On the contrary, if included, it would be injurious like an arrow. It is only a

matter of propriety that the *sthāyin* is said to become the *Rasa.* And the propriety lies in this, that the objects that were previously well-known as the causes of the *sthāyin*, now take the form of the *vibhāvas*, etc., as being helpful to relish. For, how can there be any relish in the inference of the mental state which is worldly, and hence ordinary? Thus, Abhinavagupta affirms that the relish of *Rasa*, which solely consists of a superworldly delight, is quite distinct from the normal means of knowledge like memory, inference, worldly self-consciousness, etc. (तत्र लोकव्यवहारे कार्यकारणसहचारात्मकलिगदर्शने स्थाय्यात्मपरचित्तवृत्त्यनुमानाभ्यासपाटवाद्भुना तैरेवोद्यानकटाक्षवीक्षादिभिर्लौकिकीं कारणत्वादिभुवमतिक्रान्तैर्विभावनानुभावनासमुपरञ्जकत्वमात्रप्राणैरत एवालौकिकविभावादिव्यपदेशभाग्भि: प्राच्यकारणादिरूपसंस्कारोपजीवनरव्यापनाय विभावादिनामधेयव्यपदेश्यैर्भावाध्यायेऽपि वक्ष्यमाणस्वरूपभेदैर्गुणप्रधानतापर्यायेण सामाजिकधियि सम्यग्योगं संबन्धमैकाग्र्यं वासादितवधिरलौकिकनिर्विघ्नसंवेदनात्मकचर्वणागोचरतां नीतोऽर्थश्चर्व्यमाणतैकसोरो न तु सिद्धस्वभाव: तात्कालिक एव न तु चर्वणातिरिक्तकालावलम्बी स्थायिविलक्षण एव रस: । न तु यथा शंकुकादिभिरभ्यधीयत 'स्थाय्येव विभावादिप्रत्याय्यो रस्यमानत्वाद्रस उच्यते' इति। एवं हि लौकिकेऽपि किं न रस: । असतोऽपि हि यत्र रसनीयता स्यात् तत्र वस्तुसत: कथं न भविष्यति । तेन स्थायिप्रतीतिरनुमितिरूपा प्राप्ता न रस: । अत एव सूत्रे स्थायिग्रहणं न कृतम् । तत्प्रत्युत शष्यभूतं स्यात् । केवलमौचित्यादेवमुच्यते स्थायी रसीभूत इति । औचित्यं तत्स्थायिगतत्वेन कारणादितया प्रसिद्धानामधुना चर्वणोपयोगितया विभावादित्वावलम्बनात् । तथा हि लौकिकाचित्तवृत्त्यनुमाने का रसता । तेनालौकिकचमत्कारात्मा रसास्वाद: स्मृत्यनुमानलौकिकस्वसंवेदनविलक्षण एव ।).

SUPRAMUNDANE BLISS

After bringing out this distinction of *Rasa* from the *sthāyin*, Abhinavagupta distinguishes further the nature of the relish or apprehension of *Rasa*, on the one hand, from the ordinary means of knowledge like perception, and on the other hand, from the extraordinary perception of a *Yogin* in the process of spiritual perfection, and of a *Yogin* who has achieved perfection respectively. Thus he states that a spectator who has obtained refinement by the use of ordinary inference does not approach the young woman, etc., in the drama with absolute detachment, but as the very essence of the relish which is proper to his becoming one (viz., identi-

fication) with the situation, and as the very sprout of the relish of *Rasa* which obtains fulfilment on the strength of his sensibility of the nature of the harmony or attunement of his heart, even without climbing the usual stairs of inference, memory, etc. Again, that relish of Rasa does not arise from any other earlier means of proof, so that it would result in its memory or reminiscence. Nor is here found the operation of any other means of knowledge or proof like ordinary perception, but this relish of *Rasa* is produced or effected on the strength of the assembly of the *vibhāvas*, etc., which are other-worldly. The relish is quite distinct from the apprehension of love, etc., produced by ordinary means of knowledge like perception, inference, scriptural testimony, analogy, etc., and also from the knowledge of others 'consciousness', born of perception and detached in the case of a *Yogin*, and further from the homogeneous experience or apprehension in the case of a supreme or perfected *Yogin*, consisting solely of his inner joy of the self and devoid of any tinge of sensual attachment. The distinction lies in the fact that these three kinds of knowledge are devoid of charm because of the rise of other obstacles like the acquisition of the object—because of the absence of clarity or precision resulting from detachment (of the *Yogin*) and because of the helplessness (of the perfected *Yogin*) on account of his attachment to his own objects of contemplation, respectively. However, as Abhinavagupta has stated time and again, in the case of the relish of *Rasa* there is no helplessness resulting from attachment to objects of sense because of their improbability of exclusively referring to the spectator's own self, there is no absence of precision resulting from detachment because of the absence of the objects referring necessarily and exclusively to another person on account of the spectator's inclusion in the situation, and no likelihood of other obstacles due to the spectator's attachment to his own subliminal impressions of love, etc., which are quite appropriate, and produced as a result of the generalization of the *Vibhāvas*, etc. (तथा हि लौकिकेनानुमानेन संस्कृत: प्रमदादि न

ताटस्थ्येन प्रतिपद्यते, अपि तु हृदयसंवादात्मकसहृदयत्वबलात्पूर्णीभविष्यद्रसास्वादांकुरीभावेनानुमानस्मृत्यादिसोपानमनारुह्यैव तन्मयीभावोचितचर्वणाप्राणतया । न च सा चर्वणा प्रांग्मानान्तराद येनाधुनां स्मृतिः स्यात् । न चात्र लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणव्यापारः, किंत्वलौकिकविभावादिसंयोगबलोपनतैवेयं चर्वणा । सा च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानादिलोकिकप्रमाणजनितरत्यावबोधतः तथा योगिप्रत्यक्षजतटस्थपरसंवित्तिज्ञानात् सकलवैषयिकोपरागशून्यशुद्धपरयोगिगतस्वात्मानन्दैकघनानुभवाच्च विशिष्यते । एतेषां यथायोगमर्जनादिविघ्नान्तरोदयात्, ताटस्थ्यास्फुटत्वेन विषयावेशवैवश्येन च सौन्दर्यविरहात् । अत्र तु स्वात्मैकगतत्वनियमासंभवान्न विषयावेशवैवश्यम्, स्वानुप्रवेशात्परगतत्वनियमाभावान्न ताटस्थ्यास्फुटत्वम्, तद्विभावादिसाधारण्यवशसंप्रबुद्धोचितनिजरत्यादिवासनावेशवशाच्च न विघ्नान्तरादीनां संभव इत्यवोचाम बहुशः ।).

Expatiating further on the *alaukikatva* or the supramundane nature of the *Vibhāvas* in the drama, Abhinavagupta emphasises that they are neither the material cause of the production of *Rasa*, as Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa maintains, nor are they its indicative cause as Śaṅkuka holds, leading to its inference. If they were to be the material cause of *Rasa*, there would arise the contingency of *Rasa* arising even in the absence or disappearance of their cognition, as the effect can exist even after the destruction of the cause. This does not happen in the case of the relish of *Rasa*, which lasts only as long as the *vibhāvas*, etc., last. Nor are the *vibhāvas*, etc., the indicative cause of *Rasa* which would be equivalent to the means of proof, since *rasa* is not some accomplished fact which is an object of knowledge or cognition. Then, it may be asked, what are indeed the *vibhāvas*, etc. ? Abhinavagupta replies that the operation of the *vibhāvas*, etc., is quite super-worldly and conducing to relish. And if somebody asks, 'But has it any parallel anywhere ?' Abhinavagupta asserts that this absence of a parallel or this uniqueness of the process itself speaks volumes for the superworldly nature of the *vibhāvas*, etc. And in fact the parallel does exist. When we prepare a drink like *pānaka*, is its taste seen in the individual components like molasses, black pepper, etc. ? (अत एव विभावदयो न निष्पत्तिहेतवो रसस्य, तद्बोधापगमेऽपि रससंभवप्रसंगात् । नापि ज्ञप्तिहेतवः येन प्रमाणमध्ये पतेयुः, सिद्धस्य कस्यचित् प्रमेयभूतस्य रसस्याभावात् । किं तर्ह्येतद्विभावादय इति । अलौकिक एवायं चर्वणोपयोगी विभावादिव्यवहारः । क्वान्यमेत्थं

दृष्टमिति चेद् भूषणमेतदस्माकमलौकिकत्वसिद्धेः । पानकरसास्वादोऽपि किं गुडमरीचादिषु दृष्ट इति समानमेतत् ।).

Thus if *Rasa* is not an object of cognition, should it be regarded as incomprehensible ? Abhinavagupta accepts this position, since the nature of *Rasa* consists solely in its relishability and not in its comprehensibility, and so on. Then it may be further asked, 'Why does the word "production" (niṣpatti) occur in Bharata's aphorism on *Rasa* ?' Abhinavagupta's reply is that the so-called 'production' is not of *Rasa*, but of its relish. And if *Rasa* is said to be figuratively 'produced' because of the production of its relish, on which its existence solely depends, Abhinavagupta does not find anything wrong about it. He further affirms that this relish of *Rasa* is not cognised by any means of proof, nor is it effected by any ordinary causes, though it is not without any evidence or proof, as it is evidenced by its own consciousness. In other words, it is self-evident and a matter of direct experience. The relish is undoubtedly of the nature of cognition, though it is quite distinct from all other cognitions, since the *vibhāvas*, etc., which are the means of its apprehension, are themselves totally different from the worldly means. Thus the substance of Bharata's aphorism on *Rasa* is this, that since the relish is produced because of the assembly of the *vibhāvas* etc., *Rasa* is the extraworldly object, subject to that kind of peculiar relish (नन्वेवं रसोऽप्रमेयः स्यात् । एवं युक्तं भविपुर्महति । रस्यतैकप्राणो ह्यसौ न प्रमेयादिस्वभावः । तर्हि सूत्रे निष्पत्तिरिति कथम् । नेयं रसस्य, अपि तु तद्विषयरसनायाः । तन्निष्पत्त्या तु यदि तदेकायत्तजीवितस्य रसस्य निष्पत्तिरुच्यते न कश्चिदभ दोषः । सा च रसना न प्रमाणव्यापारो न कारकव्यापारः स्वयं, तु नाप्रामाणिकी स्वसंवेदनसिद्धत्वात् । रसना च बोधरूपैव, किंतुबोधान्तरेभ्यो विलक्षणैव, उपायानां विभावादीनां लौकिकवैलक्षण्यात् । तेन विभावादिसंयोगाद्रसना यतो तिष्पछतेऽतस्तथाविधरसनागोचरो लोकोत्तरोऽर्थो रस इति तात्पर्यं सूत्रस्य ।).

This discussion of Abhinavagupta regarding the extraworldly nature of the relish of *Rasa* and its inherent distinction from all other kinds of ordinary cognitions as well as

as from *Yogic* cognition, is perhaps the epitome of his commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. It establishes the doctrine of *Rasa* on a sound philosophical basis, and emphasizes the unique nature of dramatic experience vis-a-vis all worldly experience.

Abhinavagupta briefly explains the nature of the generalization or universalization of dramatic experience like this: Our consciousness of the actor as actor is enveloped owing to the dramatic devices like a crown, head-dress, etc. Even our belief in him as Rāma does not prevail or rest, though it is induced by the persuasive power of poetic appeal, on account of the deep earlier impressions of our consciousness. Thus, the elements of space and time drop off both regarding Rāma and the actor, that is to say, we become quite oblivious of the former's being a mythological or historical figure of the heavy past and also of the actual time of the play. Even the *anubhāvas* of the actor like horripilation and so on, which are observed in daily life as causing the apprehension of love, convey the same emotion of love regardless of space and time, when they are observed in the actor. Even the spectator's cansciousness participates in this emotion of love because of its subliminal impressions present in him. Hence it is that the emotion of love is not apprehended by him in a detached manner. Nor is it apprehended as belonging exclusively to himself, as in that case there is the probability of personal feelings like the desire for acquisition, attachment, etc. The apprehension of love does not take place even as referring exclusively to another person, since in that case there will arise feelings like sorrow, hatred, etc. Thus, the sentiment of love that is transformed into the aesthetic emotion of śṛṅgāra is generalized, and becomes the object of one and the same consciousness which is of an abiding or unified nature. Further, the generalization of the emotion takes place due to the *vibhāvas*, the *anubhāvas* and the *vyabhicārins* (अयमत्र संक्षेप: । मुकुटप्रतिशीर्षकादिना तावन्नटबुद्धिराच्छद्यते । गाढप्राक्तनसंवित्संस्काराच्च काव्यबलानीयमानापि न तत्र रामधीर्विश्राम्यति । अत एवोभय-

देशकालत्याग: । रोमाञ्चादयश्च भूयसा रतिप्रतीतिकारितया दृष्टास्तभावलोकिता देशकालानियमेन रतिं गमयन्ति । यस्यां स्वात्मापि तद्वासनावत्वादनुप्रविष्ट: । अत एव न तटस्थतया रत्यवगम: । न च नियतस्वैकगततया, येनार्जनाभिषंगादिसंभावना । न च नियतपरात्मैकगततया, येन दु:खद्वेषाद्युदय: । तेन साधारणीभूता संतानवृत्तेरेकस्या एव संविदो गोचरीभूता रति: श्रृंगार: । साधारणीभावना च विभावादिभिरिति ।).

DEGREE OF PROMINENCE OF ELEMENTS

To illustrate how the generalization of the *vibhāvas*, etc. helps the delineation of a dramatic emotion, Abhinavagupta cites three examples. The first example, '*Kelīkandalitasya...*' illustrates how the prominence of the *vibhāva* and the subordination of the *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicārins* does this job. The principal thing in this verse is the charm which is constituted by the *vibhāva* or stimulant, viz., the young lady. In consonance with it appears the group of *anubhāvas* or consequents on the strength of the words, *kelī* (sport), *vibhrama* (graces), *bhaṅgura* (quivering), and *narma* (sportive), and the group of *vyabhicārins* on the strength of words like *bhaṅgī* (manner), *krama* (way), *vikāra* (instability), etc. Thus, in this instance of the dramatic emotion of śṛṅgāra which consists in the relish of the sentiment of *rati or love,* no doubt need be entertained regarding the absence of clarity. The charm of the emotion is mainly due to the prominence of the *vibhāva* (तत्र विभावप्राधान्येन साधारणीभावो यथा—

केलीकन्दलितस्य विभ्रममधोर्धुर्यं वपुस्ते दृशौ
भंगभिगुरकामकार्मुकमिदं भ्रूनर्मकर्मज्ञम: ।
आपातेऽपिविकारकारणमहो वक्त्राम्बुजस्यासव: ।
सत्यं सुन्दरि वेधसस्त्रिजगतीसारस्त्वमेका कृति: ।।

अत्र च विभावकृतं सौन्दर्यं प्राधान्येन भाति : तदनुगतत्वेन च केलीविभ्रमभंगुरनर्मवचोमहिम्ना चानुभाववर्गो भंगीक्रमविकारादिशब्दबलाच्च व्यभिचारिवर्ग: प्रतिभातीत्यत एव नास्फुटत्वशंकात्र रत्यास्वादमये श्रृंगारे विधेया ।).

As an instance of the prominence of the *anubhāvas*, Abhinavagupta cites a verse from (Bhaṭṭa) Indurāja, his own

teacher, whom he incidentally describes as the best of the twice-born, viz., the moon who swells the ocean of literature and who has been sanctified by the pure flow of literature. The verse, '*Yad viśramya*.........', describes the lovelorn condition of ladies because of Lord Kṛṣṇa. Here the group of *vyabhicārins*, mentioned by the words, *viśramya* (haltingly), *bahuśaḥ* (frequently) and *pratidinam* (daily), and the *vibhāva* mentioned by words like *Kṛṣṇa* and *yūni* (young) appear as subordinate. The assembly of *anubhāvas* shines prominently, such as paralysis characterized by halting, fickleness of glances, the fluctuation in the slimness of the figure, horripilation, paleness, etc. (अनुभावप्राधान्यं यथा शुद्धसारस्वतप्रवाहपवित्र-सकलवांगमयमहार्णवपूर्णभावसंपादनद्विजराजस्येन्दुराजस्य—

यद्विश्रम्य विलोकितेषु बहुशो निःस्थेमनी लोचने
यद्गात्राणि दरिद्रति प्रतिदिनं लनाब्जिनीनालवत् ।
दूर्वाकाण्डविडम्बकस्य निबिडो यत् पाण्डिमा गण्डयोः
कृष्णे यूनि सयौवनासु वनितास्वेषैव वेषस्थिति ॥

अत्र विश्रम्येति बहुश इति प्रतिदिनमिति च पदसमर्पितो व्यभिचारिगणः कृष्ण इत्यादिपदार्पितश्च विभावो गुणत्वेन प्रतिभासते । विश्रान्तिलक्षणस्तम्भविलोकनवैचित्यगात्रतानवतारतम्य-पुलकवैवर्ण्यप्रभृतिस्त्वनुभावसंचय प्रधानतया ।

However, Abhinavagupta emphasizes that the prominence of the *vyabhicārins* results from that of their *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, and not because of the *vyabhicārins* themselves. As an instance of this, he quotes a stanza attributed to the great poet, Kālidāsa, viz., '*Attamāttam adhikāntam ukṣitum* ......', etc Here Abhinavagupta remarks that the prominence of the *vyabhicārins* like doubt, alarm, fear, etc., which in fact lend charm to delicate young ladies like the heroine here, is due to the prominence of their *vibhāvas* like the lover, the occasion of the watersport, etc., and this prominence of the *vibhāvas* itself is reinforced by their extraordinary beauty. The group of *anubhāvas* like the throwing of water, suggested by words lika *āttamāttam* (taken up again and again) is subservient to these *vibhāvas* (व्यभिचारिणां तु प्राधान्यं तद्विभावानुभावप्राधान्य-

कृतम् । तत्राद्यं यथा महाकवे: कालिदासस्य—

आत्तमात्तमधिकान्तमुक्षितुं कातरा शफरशंकिनी जहौ ।
अञ्जलौ जलमधीरलोचना लोचनप्रतिशरीरलाञ्छितम् ॥

इत्यत्र सुकुमारप्रमदाजनभूषणभूतस्य व्यभिचारिवर्गस्य वितर्कत्रासशंकादे: प्राधान्यं तद्विभावानां प्राधान्यात् सौन्दर्यातिशयकृतात् । आत्तमात्तमित्याद्यर्पितानुभाववर्गस्तु तदनुयायी ।).

Abhinavagupta further remarks that illustrations can easily be given where we have the prominence of two out of these three. However, he also emphasises the fact that the highest relish of *Rasa* is possible only when there is an equal prominence of all the three constituents, as is chiefly the case in the ten varieties of drama only. Hence, it is that Vāmana observes in his *Kāvyālaṁkārasūtra* (I. 3), 'Of all compositions, the best is drama with its ten varieties. It is full of varied beauty like a scroll of pictures because of its comprehensiveness.' This is so because a composition or sustained narrative derives its form on account of the consideration of the propriety of language, costume, actions, etc. This happens even in a short piece or a stray verse, as it depends on the sustained composition. Abhinavagupta is illustrating here how even poetry, which may not [contain any element of drama, enables the readers to relish the emotion. In such compositions, he asserts, the appreciative readers themselves imagine the suitable context as to what happens before and after, by saying, 'On this occasion this kind of speaker is speaking this', and so on. Thus, in the case of such readers who are quite sensitive by virtue of their study of poetry and previous merit, the poetic content or theme flashes before them very distinctly just like the actual visualization, though the *vibhāvas*, etc., are depicted in a limited manner. Hence, it is that even poetry, without any element of drama in it, leads to pleasure and wisdom in their case. But in their case drama produces extreme clarity of mind and vision in accordance with the saying, 'The moon's rays, fallen over a clean object, shine all the more.' In the

case of those who are not that sensitive, the self-same drama produces the necessary clarity or purity, since therein the songs, the musical instruments, the courtesans, etc., that are apprehended, are the instruments or parts of drama, and hence do not become the cause of personal attachment (एवं द्वयप्राधान्ये चोदाहार्यम् । किन्तु समप्राधान्य एव रसास्वादस्योत्कर्षं । वस्तुतस्तु दशरूपक एव । यदाह वामन: 'संदर्भेषु दशरूपकं श्रेय: । तद्धि चित्रं चित्रपटवद्विशेष-साकष्यात् ।' इति । तद्रूपसर्पणया तु प्रबन्धे भाषावेषप्रवृत्त्यौचित्यादिकल्पनात् । तदुप-जंविनेन मुक्तके । तथा च तत्र सहृदया: पूर्वापरमुचितं परिकष्य्य ईदगत्र वक्ताऽस्मिन्नवसरे इत्यादि बहुतरं पीठबन्धरुपं विदधते । तेन ये काव्याभासप्राक्तनपुण्यादिहेतुबलादिति सहृदयास्तेषां परिमितविभावाद्युन्मीलनेऽपि परिस्फुट एव साक्षात्कारकष्प: काव्यार्थ: स्फुरति । अत एव तेषाँ काव्यमेव प्रीतिव्युत्पत्तिकृदनपेक्षितनाटयमपि । तेषामपि तु नाटयं 'निपतिता: स्फुरिता: शशिरश्मय:' इति न्यायेन सुतरां निर्मलीकरणम् । अहृदयानां च तदैव नैर्मल्याधायि, यत्र प्रतीता गीतवाद्यगणिकादयो न व्यसनितायै पर्यवस्यन्ति नाटयोपलक्षणत्वात् ।).

Here Abhinavagupta's comments on the advantage that drama possesses over pure poetry are undoubtedly illuminating. It is only the very appreciative readers, endowed with maturity and considerable aesthetic susceptivity that can visualize the whole emotional set-up or situation depicted in a poem with the obvious limitations of the poet. As opposed to this, readers less equipped with these gifts may not be able to relish the poetic emotion fully. However, drama acts equally effectively on both the types of spectators, sensitive and otherwise. For sensitive spectators it acts as a means producing the highest purification or cleansing of their minds, while for spectators lacking this sensitivity it produces the necessary purification of mind, with the help of the usual theatrical accessories like song, instrument l music, women, etc.

IMAGE AND REALITY

Abhinavagupta concludes his exhaustive gloss on the *Rasa-sūtra* of Bharata with a few remarks on the nature of the spectator's apprehension of the actor. The actor is, he postulates, the object of the deep contemplation of the

spectators, just like an image of a god like Vāsudeva in the case of his contemplators. In the case of the god's image the devotees or contemplators do not have the apprehension that it is the image itself pasted with red lead, etc., that is to be meditated upon as Lord Vāsudeva, but they apprehend it as god Vāsudeva himself, who becomes the object of a very clear conception through the means oft he image, who is a peculiar deity and confers the reward upon the meditators. In other words, they do not make any virtual distinction between the image and the deity. In a similar manner, the dramatic content, which is the object of a very clear apprehension arising from the actor's process of acting and which is not touched by specific considerations like space, time, etc., imparts instruction to the spectators in an emphatic manner, as 'This is the reward', of the contemplation. In the case of this instruction there does not arise a sublating or counteracting factor regarding other dramatic conventions or the necessary mental state. The instruction that results is comprehensive and complete. Thus, the spectator's apprehension is of the nature of 'Rāma' and not 'This (actor) is Rāma'. Abhinavagupta also promises to make this point more clear subsequently (तत्र च नटो घ्यायिनामिव क्ष्यानदम् । न हि तत्रायमेव सिन्दूरादिमयो वासुदेव: स्मरणीय इति अतिपत्ति, अपि नु तदुपायद्वारेणातिस्फुटीभूतसंकल्पगोचरो देवताविशेषो ध्यायिनां फलकृत् । तद्वन्नटप्रज्ञियाद्वारोदितातिस्फुटाध्यवसायविषयीभूतो नियतदेशकालाद्यस्पृष्टोऽत इदं फलमिति विधिस्थानीयोऽर्थो ब्युत्पत्तिं वितरति, यत्र दृश्यान्यनियमादौ चित्तवृत्त्यादौ वा न बाधकोदय: । सम्यग्ज्ञानभूतं ह्य्वेदं पूर्णम् । तेन राम इत्येव प्रतीतिर्न त्वयं राम इति । स्फुटीकरिप्यते चेतदग्रत: ।).

Appendix

Some passages from the Locana Commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* regarding *Rasa* and *Rasāsvāda* :—

(1) Commenting on the word सहृदय, viz., appreeiative or sensitive spectator or reader, in Ānandavardhana's **Vrtti** on *Dhvanyāloka* **I**. 1, Abhinavagupta observes :—

येषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशाद्विशदीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतन्मयी-भवनयोग्यता ते स्वहृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः । यथोक्तम्—

योऽर्थो हृदयसंवादी तस्य भावो रसोभ्दवः ।
शरीर व्याप्यते तेन शुष्कं काष्ठमिवाग्निना ।।इति।।

(2) Commenting on the final goal of poetry and drama, Abhinavagupta observes :

तत्र कवेस्तावत्कीर्त्यापि प्रीतिरेव सम्पाद्या । यदाह—'कीर्तिं स्वर्ग-फलामाहुः' इत्यादि । श्रोतॄणां च व्युत्पत्तिप्रीती यद्यपि स्तः, यथोक्तम्—

धमार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।
करोति कीर्तिं प्रीतिं च साधुकाव्यनिषेवणम् ।।इति।।

तथापि तत्र प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम् । अन्यथा प्रभुसंमितेभ्यो वेदादिभ्यो मित्रसंमितेभ्यश्चेतिहासादिभ्यो व्युत्पत्तिहेतुभ्यः कोऽस्य काव्यरूपस्य व्युत्पत्तिहेतोर्जायासंमितत्वलक्षणो विशेष इति आधान्येनानन्द एवोक्तः । चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तेरपि चानन्द एव पार्यन्तिकं मुख्यं फलम् । —-Locana

(3) While explaining the nature of प्रतीयमान अर्थ or suggested sense as the very soul of poetry (*Dhvanyāloka* I. 4), Abhinavagupta comments :—

यस्तु स्वप्नेऽपि न स्वशब्दवाच्यो न लौकिकव्यवहारपतितः, किं तु शब्दसमर्प्यमाणहृदयसंवादसुन्दरविभावानुभाव समुचित प्राग्विनिविष्टरत्यादिवासनानुरागसुकुमारस्वसंविदानन्दचर्वणाव्यापाररसनीयरूपो रसः, स काव्यव्यापारैकगोचरो रसध्वनिरिति, स च ध्वनिरवैति, स एव मुख्यतयात्मेति।

(4) Explaining the words 'काव्यस्यात्मा स एवार्थ...' in *Dhvanyāloka* I. 5, Abhinavagupta comments as follows :—

तेन रस एव वस्तुत आत्मा, वस्त्वलङ्कारध्वनी तु सर्वथा रसं प्रति पर्यवस्येते इति वाच्यादुत्कृष्टौ तावित्यभिप्रायेण ध्वनिः काव्यस्मात्मे' ति सामान्येनोक्तम्।

In the same passage, he refers to the impersonal nature of Vālmīki's sorrow in the क्रौञ्चवध episode in the *Rāmāyana* :—

न तु मुनेः शोक इति मन्तव्यम्। एवं हि सति तद्दुःखेन सोऽपि दुःखित इति कृत्वा रसस्यात्मतेति निरवकाशं भवेत्। न च दुःखसंतप्तस्यैषा दशेति। एवं चर्वणोचितशोकस्थायिभावात्मककरूणरससमुच्चलनस्वभावत्वात्स एव काव्यस्यात्मा सारभूतस्वभावोऽपरशाब्दवैलक्षण्यकारकः।

(5) Explaining the nature of *pratibhā* or poetic genius mentioned in *Dhvanyāloka* I. 6, Abhinavagupta says :—

'अतिभा' अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा अज्ञा;तस्या 'विशेषो' रसावेशवैशद्यसौन्दर्यं काव्यनिर्माणक्षमत्वम्। यदाह मुनिः—'कवेरन्तर्गतं भावम्' इति।

(6) Commenting on *Dhvanyāloka* I. 18 and its *Vṛtti*, Abhinavagupta thus emphasises the unique nature of रसास्वाद :-

यस्त्वलौकिकचमत्कारात्मा रसास्वादः काव्यगतविभावादिचर्वणाप्राणो नासौ स्मरणानुमानादिसाम्येन खिलीकारपात्रीकर्तव्यः। किं तु लौकिकेन कार्यकारणानुमानादिना संस्कृतहृदयो विभावादिकं प्रतिपद्यमान एव न ताटस्थ्येन प्रतिपद्यते, अपि तु हृदयसंवादापरपर्यायसहृदयत्वपरवशीकृततया पूर्णीभविष्यद्रसास्वादाङ्कुरीभावेनानुमानस्मरणादिसरणिमनारुह्यैव तन्मयीभवनोचितचर्वणाप्राणतया। न चासौ चर्वणा प्रमाणान्तरतो जाता पूर्वं, येनेदानीं स्मृतिः स्यात्। न चाधुना कुतश्चित्प्रमाणान्तरादुत्पन्ना, अलौकिके प्रत्यक्षाद्यव्यापारात्। अत एवालौकिक एव विभावादिव्यवहारः। ... अत एव परकीया न चित्तवृत्तिर्गम्यत इत्यभिप्रायेण 'विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः' इति सूत्रे स्थायिग्रहणं न कृतम्। तत्प्रत्युत शल्यभूतं स्यात्। स्थायिनस्तु रसीभाव औचित्यादुच्यते, तद्विभावानुभावोचितचित्त वृत्तिसंस्कारसुन्दरचर्वणोदयात्।..... ननु यदि नेयं ज्ञप्तिर्न वा निष्पत्तिः, तर्हि किमेतत्? न त्वयमसावलौकिको रसः। ननु विभावादिरत्र किं ज्ञापको हेतुः, उत कारकः? न ज्ञापको न कारकः अपि तु चर्वणोपयोगी। ननु क्वैतद् दृष्टमन्यत्र। यत एव न दृष्टं तत एवालौकिकमित्युक्तम्। नन्वेवं रसोऽप्रमाणं स्यात्; अस्तु, किं ततः? तच्चर्वणात एव प्रीतिव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धेः किमन्यदर्थनीयम्। नन्वप्रमाणकमेतत्; न, स्वसंवेदनसिद्धत्वात्। ज्ञानविशेषस्यैव चर्वणात्मत्वात् इत्यलं बहुना। अतश्च रसोऽयमलौकिकः। ......इह तु विभावादिचर्वणाद्भुतपुष्पवत्तत्कालसारैवोदिता न तु पूर्वापरकालानुबन्धिनीति लौकिकादास्वादाद्योगिविषयाच्चान्य एवायं रसास्वादः।

(7) Explaining the meaning of *Dhvanyāloka* **II**. 4, Abhinavagupta thus summarizes the various views about the realization of Rasa-experience :—

ननूक्तं भट्टनायकेन—'रसो यदा परगततया प्रतीयते तर्हि ताटस्थ्यमेव स्यात्। न च स्वगतत्वेन रामादिचरितमयात्काव्यादसौ प्रतीयते। स्वात्मगतत्वेन च प्रतीतौ स्वात्मनि रसस्योत्पत्तिरेवाभ्युपगता स्यात्। सा चायुक्ता, सीतायाः सामाजिकं प्रत्यविभावत्वात्। कान्तात्वं साधारणं वासनाविकासहेतुर्विभावतायां प्रयोजकमिति चेत्—देवतावर्णनादौ तदपि कथम्। न च स्वकान्तास्मरणं मध्ये संवेद्यते। अलोकसामान्यानां च रामादीनां ये समुद्रसेतुबन्धादयो विभावास्ते कथं साधारणं भजेयुः। न

चोत्साहादिमान् रामः स्मर्यते, अननुभूतत्वात् । शब्दादपि तत्प्रतिपत्तौ न रसोपजनः । प्रत्यक्षादिव नायकमिथुनप्रतिपत्तौ । उत्पत्तिपक्षे च करुणस्योत्पादाद् दुःखित्वे करुणप्रेक्षासु पुनरप्रवृत्तिः स्यात् । तन्न उत्पत्तिरपि, नाप्यभिव्यक्तिः, शक्तिरूपस्य हि श्रृंगारस्याभिव्यक्तौ विषयार्जनतारतम्यप्रवृत्तिः स्यात् । तत्रापि किं स्वागतोऽभिव्यज्यते रसः परगतो वेति पूर्ववदेव दोषः । तेन न प्रतीयते नोत्पद्यते नाभिव्यज्यते काव्येन रसः । किं त्वन्यशब्दवैलक्षण्यं काव्यात्मनः शब्दस्य त्र्यंशता प्रसादात् । तत्राभिधायकत्वं वाच्यविषयम्, भावकत्वं रसादिविषयम्, भोगकृत्त्वं सहृदयविषयमिति त्रयोंऽशभूता व्यापाराः । तत्राभिधाभागो यदि शुद्धः स्यात्तत्तन्त्रादिभ्यः शास्त्रन्यायेभ्यः श्लेषाद्यलंकाराणां को भेदः? वृत्तिभेदवैचित्र्यं चाकिञ्चित्करम् । श्रुतिदुष्टादिवर्जनं च किमर्थम् ? तेन रसभावनाख्यो द्वितीयो व्यापारः, यद्वशादभिधा विलक्षणैव । तच्चैतद्भावकत्वं नाम रसान् प्रति यत्काव्यस्य तद्विभावादीनां साधारणत्वापादनं नाम । भाविते च रसे तस्य भोगः योऽनुभवस्मरणप्रतिपत्तिभ्यो विलक्षण एव द्रुतिविस्तरविकासात्मा रजस्तमोवैचित्र्यानुविद्धसत्त्वमयनिजचित्स्वभावनिर्वृतिविश्रान्तिलक्षणः परब्रह्मास्वादसविधः । स एव च प्रधानभूतोंऽशः सिद्धरूप इति । व्युत्पत्तिर्नामाप्रधानमेवे' ति ।

अत्रोच्यते-रसस्वरूप एव तावद्विप्रतिपत्तयः प्रतिवादिनाम् । तथाहि-पूर्वावस्थायां यः स्थायी स एव व्यभिचारिसम्पातादिना प्राप्तपरिपोषोऽनुकार्यगत एव रसः । नाट्ये तु प्रयुज्यमानत्वान्नाट्यरस इति केचित् । प्रवाहधर्मिण्यां चित्तवृत्तौ चित्तवृत्तेः चित्तवृत्त्यन्तरेण कः परिपोषार्थः ? विस्मयशोकक्रोधादेश्च क्रमेण तावन्न परिपोष इति नानुकार्ये रसः । अनुकर्तरि च तद्भावे लयाद्यननुसरणं स्यात् । सामाजिकगते वा कश्चमत्कारः ? प्रत्युत करुणादौ दुःखप्राप्तिः । तस्मान्नायं पक्षः । कस्तर्हि ? इहानन्त्यान्नियतस्यानुकारो न शक्यः, निष्प्रयोजनश्च, विशिष्टताप्रतीतौ ताटस्थ्येन व्युत्पत्त्यभावात् ।

तस्मादनियतावस्थात्मकं स्थायिनमुद्दिश्य विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिभिः संयुज्यमानैरयं रामः सुखीति स्मृतिविलक्षणा स्थायिनि अतीतिगोचरतयास्वादरुपा प्रतिपत्तिरनुकर्त्रालम्बना नाट्यैकगामिनी रसः । स च न व्यतिरिक्तमाधारमपेक्षते । किं त्वनुकार्याभिन्नाभिमते नर्तके आस्वादयिता सामाजिक इत्येतावन्मात्रमदः । तेन नाट्य एव रसः, नानुकार्यादिष्विति केचित् ।

अन्ये तु—अनुकर्तरि यः स्थाय्यवभासोऽभिनयादिसामग्र्यादिकृतो भित्ताविव हरितालादिना अश्वावभासः, स एव लोकातीततयास्वादापरसंज्ञया प्रतीत्या रस्यमानो रस इति नाट्याद्रसा नाट्यरसाः। अपरे पुनर्विभावानुभावमात्रमेव विशिष्टसामग्र्या समर्प्यमाणं तद्विभावनीयानुभावनीयस्थायिरूपचित्तवृत्त्युचितवासनानुषक्तं स्वनिर्वृतिचर्वणाविशिष्टमेव रसः। तन्नाट्यमेव रसः। अन्ये तु शुद्धं विभावम्, अपरे शुद्धमनुभावम्, केचित्तु स्थायिमात्रम्, इतरे व्यभिचारिणम्, अन्ये तत्संयोगम्, एकेऽनुकार्यम्, केचन सकलमेव समुदायं रसमाहुरित्यलं बहुना।

काव्येऽपि च लोकनाट्यधर्मिस्थानीयेन स्वभावोक्तिवक्रोक्तिप्रकारद्वयेनालौकिकप्रसन्नमधुरौजस्विशब्दसमर्प्यमाणविभावादियोगादियमेव रसवार्ता। अस्तु वात्र नाट्याद्विचित्ररूपा रसप्रतीतिः, उपायवैलक्षण्यादियमेव तावदत्र सरणिः। एवं स्थिते प्रथमपक्ष एवैतानि दूषणानि, प्रतीतेः स्वपरगतत्वादिविकल्पनेन। सर्वपक्षेषु च प्रतीतिरपरिहार्या रसस्य। अप्रतीतं हि पिशाचवदव्यवहार्यं स्यात्। किं तु यथा प्रतीतिमात्रत्वेनाविशिष्टत्वेऽपि प्रात्यक्षिकी आनुमानिकी आगमोत्था प्रतिभानकृता योगिप्रत्यक्षजा च प्रतीतिरुपायवैलक्षण्यादन्यैव, तद्वदियमपि प्रतीतिश्चर्वणास्वादनभोगापरनामा भवतु। तन्निदानभूताया हृदयसंवादाद्युपकृताया विभावादिसामग्र्या लोकोत्तररूपत्वात्। रसाः प्रतीयन्तइति ओदनं पचतीतिवद् व्यवहारः प्रतीयमान एव हि रसः। प्रतीतिरेव विशिष्टा रसना। सा च नाट्ये लौकिकानुमानप्रतीतेर्विलक्षणा; तां च प्रमुखे उपायतया सन्दधाना। एवं काव्ये अन्यशाब्दप्रतीतेर्विलक्षणा, तां च प्रमुखे उपायतयापेक्षमाणा।

तस्मादनुत्थानोपहतः पूर्वपक्षः। रामादिचरितं तु न सर्वस्य हृदयसंवादीति महत्साहसम्। चित्रवासनाविशिष्टत्वाच्चेतसः। यदाह-'तासामनादित्वमाशिषो नित्यत्वात्। जातिदेशकालव्यवहितानामप्यानन्तर्यं स्मृतिसंस्कारयोरेकरूपत्वात्' इति। तेन प्रतीतिस्तावद्रसस्य सिद्धा। सा च रसनारूपा प्रतीतिरुत्पद्यते। वाच्यवाचकयोस्तत्राभिधादिविविक्तो व्यञ्जनात्मा ध्वननव्यापार एव। भोगीकरणव्यापारश्च काव्यस्य रसविषयो ध्वननात्मैष, नान्यत्किञ्चित्। भावकत्वमपि समुचितगुणालङ्कारपरिग्रहात्मकमस्माभिरेव वितत्य वक्ष्यते। किमेतदपूर्वम्? काव्यं च रसान् प्रतिभावकमिति यदुच्यते, तत्र भवतैव भावनादुत्पत्तिपक्ष एव

प्रत्युज्जीवितः । न च काव्यशब्दानां केवलानां भावकत्वम्, अर्थापरिज्ञाने तदभावात् । न च केवलानामर्थानाम्, शब्दान्तरेणार्प्यमाणत्वे तद्योगात् । द्वयोस्तु भावकत्वमस्माभिरेवोक्तम् । 'यत्रार्थः शब्दो वा तमर्थं व्यंगक्त.' इत्यत्र । तस्माद्व्यञ्जकत्वाख्येन व्यापारेण गुणालङ्कारौचित्यादिकयेतिकर्तव्यतया काव्यं भावकं रसान् भावयति, इति त्र्यंशायामपि भावनायां करणांशे ध्वननमेव निपतति । भोगोऽपि न काव्यशब्देन क्रियते, अपि तु घनमोहान्ध्यसङ्कटतानिवृत्तिद्वारेणास्वादापरनाम्नि अलौकिके द्रुतिविस्तरविकासात्मनि भोगे कर्तव्ये लोकोत्तरे ध्वननव्यापार एव मूर्धाभिषिक्तः । तच्चेंद भोगकृत्त्वं रसस्य ध्वननीयत्वे सिद्धे दैवसिद्धम् । रस्यमानतोदितचमत्कारानतिरिक्तत्वाद्भोगस्येति । सत्त्वादीनां चाङ्गाङ्गिभाववैचित्र्यस्यानन्त्याद् द्रुत्यादित्वेनास्वादगणना न युक्ता । परब्रह्मास्वादसब्रह्मचारित्वं चारुवस्यरसास्वादस्य । व्युत्पादनं च शासनप्रतिपादनाभ्यां शास्त्रेतिहासकृताभ्यां विलक्षणम् । यथा रामस्तथाहमित्युपमानातिरिक्तां रसास्वादोपायस्वप्रतिभाविजृम्भारूपां व्युत्पत्तिमन्ते करोतीति कमुपालभामहे । तस्मात्स्थितमेतत्अभिव्यज्यन्ते रसाः प्रतीत्यैव च रस्यन्त इति । तत्राभिव्यक्तिः प्रधानतया भवत्वन्यथा वा । प्रधानत्वे ध्वनिः, अन्यथा रसाद्यलङ्काराः ।

Select Bibliography

A. SANSKRIT WORKS

1. *Abhijñānaśakuntalam* of Kālidāsa ; ed. B.V. Vyas *et al*, A.R. Sheth and Co., Bombay, **1962**.

2. *Abhinavabhāratī* of Abhinavagupta : ed. along with *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata by M.R. Kavi in **Gaekwad's Oriental series**, Vol. **I**, Baroda, **1926**.

3. *Daśārūpaka* of Dhanañjaya : ed. with *Avaloka of Dhanika* by Dr. Bholashankar Vyas, chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, Varanasi, **1976**.

4. *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana : ed. with Abhinavagupta's *Locana* by Ram Sagar Tripathi in 3 Vols., Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, **1963**, **1973**, **1975**.

5. *Dhvanyālokalocana* of Abhinavagupta : ed. by Ram Sagar Tripathi along with *Dhvanyāloka* in 3 Vols., Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, **1963, 1973, 1975**.

6. *Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammata : Edited with English translation in 2 Vols. by Ganganatha Jha, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Varanasi I, Vol. I, **1967**.

7. *Kāvyādarśa* of Daṇḍin : ed. by D.K. Gupta, Meherchand Lacchmandas, Delhi, **1973**.

8. *Kāvyālaṅkāra* of Bhāmaha : ed. by P.V. Naganatha Sastry, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1970.

9. *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtrāṇī* of Vāmana : ed. by Narayan Ram Acharya, Nirnayasagara Press, Bombay 2, 1953.

10. *Kumārasambhavam* of Kālidāsa : ed. by Śri Pradyumna Pandey, Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, Varanasi, 1963.

11. *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharatamuni : ed. by Pandit Kedarnath, **Kavyamala No. 42**, Nirṇayasagar Press, Bombay, 1943.

12. *Rasagaṅgādharaḥ* of Jagannātha : tran. by R.B. Athavale in Marathi in 2 vols., Tilk Maharashtra Vidyapeeth, Pune, 1953, 1965.

13. *Sāhityadarpaṇa* of Viśvanātha : ed. by Satyavrat Singh, Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, Varanasi-I, 1963.

14. *Vakroktijīvita* of Kuntaka : ed. by S.K. De, Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1961.
Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa Khaṇḍa III : tran. by Stella Cramrisch, Calcutta University Press, 1928.

B. ENGLISH WORKS

15. Aristotle—*Poetics* : ed. by Betty Radice and Robert Baldick in *Classical Literary Criticism*, Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1965.

16. Butcher S.H.—*Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*. with Intro. by John Gassner : Dover Publications Inc., New York, 1951.

17. Coomaraswamy Ananda K.—*The Transformation of Nature in Art* : Dover Publications, New York, 1956.

18. Cramrisch Stella—*Viṣṇupurāṇa*, Section III : (Tran.) Calcutta University Press, 1928.

19. De S.K.—*History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, **1960**.

De S.K.—*Sanskrit Poetics, as a study of Aesthetic* : Oxford University Press, **1963**.

20. Gnoli R.—*The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta* : Cnowkhamba Sanskrit series, **1968**.

21. Kane P.V.—*History of Sanskrit Poetics* : Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, **1971**.

22. Krishnamoorthy K.—*Essays in Sanskrit Criticism*, Karnatak University, Dharwar, **1974**.

23. Langer Susanne K.—*Problems of Art* : Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, **1957**.

24. *Masson J.L. and Patwardhan M.V.—Aesthetic Rapture*, (in 2 Vols.) : Deccan College, Postgraduate and Research Institute, Poona, **1970**.

25. *Masson, J.L. and Patwardhan M.V.—Śāntarasa* and *Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics* : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, **1969**.

26. Osborne Harold ed.—*Aesthetics in the Modern World* : Thames and Hudson, London, **1968**.

27. Pandey K. C. — *Abhinavagupta — An Historical and Philosophical Study* : Chowkhamba Sanskrit series, Varanasi **1963**.

28. Pandey K.C.—*Indian Aesthetics*, being vol.I of *Comparative Aesthetics* : Chogkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi **1959**.

29. Preminger Alex ed.—*Princeton Encyclopaedia of Poetry and Poetics* : Princeton University Press, New Jersey, **1972**,

30. Raghavan V.—*The Number of Rasas* : Adyar Library and Research Centre, **1967**.

31. Stone Irving.—*The Agony and the Ecstasy* : Signet, The New American Library, Inc., Nev york, **1961**.

C. MARATHI WORKS

32. Patankar R.B.—*Saundaryamimamsa* : Mouj Prakashan, Bombay, **1973**.

INDEX

AJANTA'S SERIES ON AESTHETICS

Vol. I AESTHETIC THEORY AND ART : *RANJAN K. GHOSH*
Demy 8vo Ist edition 1979 Rs. 45 $ 9

Vol. II ABHINAVAGUPTA ON INDIAN AESTHETICS
Y. S. WALIMBE
Demy 8vo Ist edition 1980 Rs. 30 $ 6

Vol. III AESTHETIC MEANING : Some Recent Theories
REKHA JHANJI
Demy 8vo Ist edition 1980 Rs. 55 $ 11

Vol. IV COMMUNICATION AND THE ARTS
REKHA JHANJI (Eds)
Demy 8vo Ist edition 1980 (in press

Vol V ART AND SOCIETY : Chernysevsky's Aesthetic Principles
VIRENDRA K. ROY (Eds) (in process)

Vol. VI PROBLEMS OF AESTHETICS : A Marxian Perspective
VIRENDRA K. ROY (in process)

ajanta books international
Publishers · Wholesalers · Exporters · Importers
1 U B JAWAHAR NAGAR, BUNGALOW ROAD, DELHI-7 (INDIA)